MODERNIZATION OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

OCTOBER 5, 1981

Page

Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., Secretary of Defense, accompanied by Hon. Richard DeLauer, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; and Gen. David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 3

NOVEMBER 5, 1981

Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., Secretary of Defense, accompanied by Gen. David Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 41

MODERNIZATION OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT

MONDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice at 10:09 a.m., in room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Goldwater, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Denton, Jackson, Byrd, Nunn, Exon, and Levin.

Also present: Senator Mark Andrews.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Michael B. Donley, Robert S. Dotson, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Edward B. Kenney, Ronald F. Lehman, José E. Martinez, E. George Riedel, Carl M. Smith, and Kathleen Troia, professional staff members; Richard D. Finn, research assistant; and Carol J. Rudolph, staff assistant.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Paul S. Schreiber, assistant to Senator Denton, Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armistead, assistant to Senator Byrd; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

This is the first hearing on the strategic package which was announced by the President last Friday.

We are delighted to welcome the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Jones; and the Under Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. DeLauer.

There is, as you know, Mr. Secretary, somewhat more than casual interest in your proposals. I might say that we do commend you for recommending a total strategic package. I don't think we can consider individual strategic systems unless we consider them in the context of our overall strategic capability, the extent to which it provides an adequate defense for the United States and its allies, the extent to which it serves as a deterrent to attack by the Soviet Union and the extent to which it puts us in a position, to negotiate a genuine arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.

I am concerned whether we can accommodate the funding of all that you propose. Certainly, the modernization of our strategic force must be our No. 1 priority. We are, of course, dismayed to have to accept some reductions in the 1982 defense budget. I recognize the enormous pressures that the administration was under in attempting to achieve more reductions in Federal spending.

I am glad that the President did not go any further than he did in recommending a reduction in outlays. It should be understood that to achieve that $2 billion in outlays we had to make cuts of over $7.5 billion in obligational authority.

There seems to be a disposition on the part of some Members of Congress to reduce defense spending even further. In my view, that would seriously jeopardize our ability to rebuild our defense capability and maintain any margin of safety in our posture vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union.

I hope that my colleagues can be dissuaded from this. If they cannot be, I feel some of the proposals in your package, Mr. Secretary, will be in jeopardy.

We have already anticipated some of the things you recommended in the authorization bill that we have already passed. For example, the D-5 missile, the improvement in our command, control and communications capabilities and the funding of a long-range combat aircraft or penetrating bomber.

I personally am concerned, and I think others are concerned, with one aspect of the package that has to do with the basing mode of the MX missile. I am glad to see the administration decided to proceed with the development, testing and evaluation and production of the MX. I think had we gone to a common missile we would have sacrificed missile deployment. The common missile exists only on paper, whereas, the MX will be flown in the next 16 months in its initial tests.

As to the basing mode, my own personal feeling is that what is recommended does not enhance the survivability of the MX missile. In the process of considering long-term options to the one recommended—placing the MX missile in existing missile silos—I am very disappointed that a multiple protective shelter system was rejected outright and is not even to be considered as one of the options for the future. After all, a large number of military and technical experts in what we might call broadly the defense community have come to the conclusion that an MPS mode coupled with a ballistic missile defense system offers us the best prospect for survivability, complicates the Soviet problem more and provides us with the best bargaining position.

I hope that in the consideration of options for the long term this proposition, which has already been authorized by the Congress and is supported strongly in the defense community, will also be considered.

I hope that the decision on MPS is not final and irrevocable. It would not seem proper to consider only paper options such as the Big Bird about which there are many doubts, and not consider what has already been studied carefully and been recommended.

The proposal, of course, that came out Friday is tantamount to cancellation of an ongoing program already authorized by the Congress. We will want to know why this has been rejected for consideration as a future option.

We want to support your efforts, Mr. Secretary. I think you will find this committee is disposed to do no less in terms of overall capability than what the President has recommended. We hope further that you and the President will stick to your guns on the matter of any further cuts in defense spending and will do all you can to persuade key Members of the Congress that we cannot afford any further reductions.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed as you see fit. If you would like your associates to speak before we go to questions, we can do that.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

Chairman TOWER. I will permit statements at the outset; however, I would hope we can keep them short, because the Secretary is operating under time restraints and I do want to save time for questions. Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, I want to say a few words because for the first time in my memory I am in disagreement with you.

I am extremely happy about the continuation of the B-1. I think, probably one of the biggest mistakes that any President ever made was to stop that aircraft.

I am happy about the new bomber, although I know it is a long way off.

I am happy about the decision on the MX. I have never believed that the multiple basing mode presented any advantage to us. I am not of the belief that the Russians could not have figured it out in a matter of hours and the silos would have been of no use. I like the use of the present silos to replace the antiquated missiles we have in them.

I would hope though that you would continue a study of a basing mode that might be better accepted.

I am very pleased with your decision to improve command, control, and communications. This is one area that we have been weak in, where we should be—without question—the strongest, because of our electronic and technical capability.

And I am very pleased with the submarine base decision.

I am pleased that the President, you and the Joint Chiefs made, probably, the only decision that could be made at this time. I am not convinced that you cannot come up with something that will please everybody. In the meantime, we do achieve the use of new missiles in old silos and we achieve—and more importantly to me—the use of probably the best aircraft flying in the world today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Any further comments before we proceed? Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. RICHARD DELAUER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; AND GEN. DAVID C. JONES, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again today. I do appreciate your remarks, Mr. Chairman. I perhaps appreciate Senator

Goldwater's remarks more, but I am glad to have the differing views so that we can try to meet those at the outset.

Mr. Chairman, we do believe very firmly that this is a very comprehensive program and that it will end the decline of the U.S. strategic capability and create a deterrent that is far more stable and more secure than exists today.

I want to stress at the outset—you raised the point, Mr. Chairman, and I think it is a valid point—that this program is fully affordable. It fits within the President's fiscal guidelines and is within the fiscal framework decided upon in March for the strategic programs for the next 6 years.

The direct costs associated with the strategic buildup of the early 1960's consumed over 20 percent of the total defense budget, whereas, the strategic program that we present to you today will consume less than 15 percent of the defense spending over the next 6 years.

This means we will have appropriate resources for strengthening and making ready our conventional and theater nuclear forces as well. In some cases, when obsolescent strategic forces will be retired to help fund new initiatives, his will not reduce our overall capability.

The specific objectives of President Reagan's program are to regain and to maintain the strategic balance with the Soviet Union since this balance is the key to deterring any attack by them against ourselves or our allies.

This balance is also the key to securing any genuine arms reduction agreement with the U.S.S.R.

The "window of vulnerability" which has been so variously defined recently, is simply the period which will occur if we do nothing now to improve our own strategic strength. That window will be at its widest in the period 1985–86 because we have not modernized or strengthened our strategic force as we should have in the past, and the fact that the Soviets have never slowed their modernization or strengthening of their strategic forces or their other forces since 1961.

The momentum is now in their favor because all these systems take so long to bring on line. So we must start now and we must acquire all the additional strength we can as quickly as possible. That is why parts of this program are designed to get us additional strengths for the 1985–86 period.

In short, that is why we seek first to redress the most serious weaknesses in our current position by modernizing existing forces and at the same time investing in those new forces required to see us safely into the next century and beyond.

As an underlying and vital part to all this, our purpose is the absolute necessity to improve significantly our communications and control systems, as Senator Goldwater mentioned. We must also have a survivable and enduring means of detecting a nuclear attack.

We must be able to detect attacks should they come, communicating with our strategic forces after such an attack has occurred, and retaining the ability to deliver a counter thrust, the strength of which will be so strong as to be so unacceptably high to the Soviets so that they will be deterred from such an atrocity.

Finally, we must provide a technological base for the continued improvement of our forces and their supporting elements, so we will pursue a comprehensive strategic research and development program.

The President's program consists of five mutually reinforcing elements based on our strong belief that we must have a Triad of forces and supporting communications and control deterrence, each part of which will be as strong and as survivable as possible.

First, improvements in command and control systems.

Second, modernization of strategic bombers so we retain the capability to penetrate Soviet air defenses by manned bombers.

Third, deployment of new submarine-launched missiles which, in many ways are the most survivable of all systems. With the new and more accurate, stronger missile, that leg of the Triad will be even stronger.

Fourth, a step-by-step plan to improve the strength and accuracy of new land-based missiles and to reduce their vulnerability and, I might add, to bring them on-line as soon as we can.

Fifth, improvement in strategic defenses as another means of discouraging and deterring attack.

Over the past 10 years we have not done enough to make warning command and control systems as capable and survivable as they need to be. They should provide timely warning of an attack so that the President may respond appropriately and they also should be survivable so that our nuclear forces can serve as instruments of national policy. Our goal is to make these improved systems as strong as the forces they support.

To improve our strategic warning capability we will upgrade the survivability of our warning satellites and deploy several mobile ground terminals to back up our data processing capability for these satellites. Mobile systems such as these are virtually impossible for the Soviets to target. Additionally, both our satellite and ground-based radar warning systems will be improved so we would be able to obtain more definite warning should an attack occur. Surveillance radars, which would help us to detect an SLBM attack, will be added to cover potential submarine operating areas to the Southeast and Southwest.

To upgrade the capability and survivability of command and control systems, we will deploy E–4B airborne command posts to serve the National Command Authorities (NCA) in time of war, and harden existing EC–135 airborne command posts for our military commanders in the field against nuclear effects. The EC–135's will also receive additional enhancements in their ability to communicate with both the NCA and the strategic forces.

We will develop a new satellite communications system employing extremely high frequency channels so the President's orders can be passed from command centers to our commanders and forces. Our bombers will receive very low-frequency and low-frequency communications receivers to enhance their ability to communicate with command centers. Our deployed submarines will also receive an upgraded communications package. At the same time, we will be initiating a vigorous R. & D. program leading to a command and control system that will endure for an extended period beyond any initial nuclear attack we may have to sustain.

The previous administration was willing to live with the risks of an aging B–52 force for the 1980's, and the uncertain schedule and unproven capabilities of an advanced technology bomber—ATB or Stealth—for the 1990's. We have chosen a far less risky course in a field where the margin for error is exceedingly small. Our program will provide much needed capability in the 1980's and will respond to the congressional mandate to field a new bomber by 1987. In fact, it will be fielded sooner than that. It also provides the necessary management to produce, as soon as possible, the best and least costly advanced technology bomber which should give us significant advantages into the next century.

Specifically, we will procure a force of 100 B–1 bombers with an initial operational capability in 1986. This highly capable aircraft will have the ability of serving a dual role as a more survivable and enduring cruise missile and penetrating weapons platform as we develop the ATB.

What has been frequently overlooked in the last few days is the fact that the B–1 will also have a most important conventional role for many years to come.

Our vigorous ATB program will lead to that plane's deployment, under current plans, beginning in 1989 or 1990. We will modernize a selected portion of our newer B–52's to carry cruise missiles and make them more survivable overall. The older B–52D's will be retired in 1982 and 1983. A force of over 3,000 cruise missiles will be deployed beginning next year, in B–52G's and H's, and later in the B–1 aircraft.

Finally, existing KC–135 aerial tankers will be outfitted with new engines to increase our airborne refueling capabilities.

The "two-bomber" approach of the administration's program will not only provide capability when needed but also will help in controlling costs by stimulating competition; allowing for flexible procurement policies, and providing the B–1 for use as a cruise missile carrier for the 1990's—instead of another, yet-to-be-developed aircraft.

The cornerstone of our program for the sea-based forces is the development of the larger more accurate submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) known as the D–5 or Trident II missile. This missile, which we will deploy in 1989, nearly doubles the payload of its predecessor, the C–4, and is more accurate as well. We thus maintain our sea-based capabilities when large numbers of older Poseidon submarines retire in the 1990's. At the same time, we provide the additional targeting capabilities that come with a more accurate missile. We plan to continue construction of the Trident ballistic missile submarines at a steady rate of one per year. The lead Trident has had a highly successful series of sea trials which have exceeded our expectations. With most of the construction difficulties of the past resolved, we now look forward to a highly successful program.

In addition to our longer term plans, we will deploy several hundred nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles on our general purpose submarines beginning in 1984. These missiles will serve to strengthen our deterrent by enhancing our Strategic Reserve Force. Let me emphasize, however, that these sea-launched cruise missiles are no substitute for the ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing II ballistic missile in Europe; they serve different purposes and have different capabilities.

One of their principal virtues is that we can get them quickly.

Much worry has been expressed, and correctly, about the window of vulnerability and the middle of this decade being a period of substantial danger—acquisition of many cruise missiles, which can be accomplished more quickly than any other form of effective deterrent, will do much to close that window and reduce the danger during that critical time period.

As I am sure you are aware, and we have learned this morning, the quest for a satisfactory solution to the increasing vulnerability of our existing land-based ICBM's has been a particularly vexing one for this administration and its predecessors. The Reagan program provides a step-by-step modernization program for the ICBM force.

We will continue all development of the MX missile, procuring 100 operational missiles and provide for an initial deployment of a limited number—possibly 36—in Titan or Minuteman III silos, which are sized to take the missile. These silos will be reconstructed to provide superhardness to nuclear effects.

We are talking about hardening to withstand up to 5,000 pounds per square inch. You mentioned in your opening statement that there is no point in putting them in existing silos, and we agree. We are putting them in specially hardened silos whose strength will increase their tolerance to over pressure up to about 5,000 pounds per square inch, as compared with about 2,000 pounds per square inch for the Minuteman now and as compared with about 600 pounds per square inch for the planned 4,600 shelters of the previous administration's plan.

As I have already announced, all Titan missiles will be deactivated. Deploying the MX in reconstructed silos gives us a short-term improvement to our existing ICBM force. It is an interim way of breaking the Soviet monopoly on prompt hard-target-counterforce capability until the D–5 and more permanent MX deployments become operational. It also provides a vastly stronger and more accurate weapon with 10 warheads for the Soviets to consider in their own strategic consultations. It has been criticized as a "stopgap" measure, and you can say without accepting that criticism, that the gap of the mid-decade period has to be closed. This gap is a wide one and this program is the most effective way of closing that gap.

Again, I emphasize this is a field of activity in which we believe our margin for being wrong and taking risks is very, very small.

Meanwhile, we will pursue R. & D. on three promising programs which would give us survivable MX basing for a much longer period. These are:

One. Continuous airborne patrol aircraft—development of a long-endurance aircraft which could carry and launch an MX missile and which has some very promising aspects at this point.

Two. Ballistic missile defense and land-based missiles—the development of an ABM system to provide protective coverage and survivability of land-based ICBM's, even though their basing is known to the Soviets.

Three. Deep underground basing and placement on the south side of mesas—the hardening of MX silos to survive all but a direct hit and placement of silos in a manner designed to protect them against existing Soviet targeting.

These are all possibilities, the most promising of an even larger number, and we expect to choose among one or, more likely several, of these options in 1984.

This is not a decision to wait as some have said. It is a program to give us the strongest possible deterrent forces as quickly as we can get them and to continue our constant search for something even better and more survivable.

What we think we cannot do is put a vast amount of our resources in a plan that we know is not survivable even now.

As the President has directed, we are canceling the so-called multiple protective shelter (MPS) basing schemes for the MX missile. Even at its completion, this large-scale plan of the previous administration would be as vulnerable as Minuteman is today should the Soviets increase their warhead inventories to within entirely feasible limits. In fact, it would be even more vulnerable because the proposed MPS shelter would be quite soft—600 pounds per square inch, as compared with 2,000 pounds per square inch on the present Minuteman silos, and up to 5,000 pounds per square inch for our proposal for those silos which would house the new MX. The MPS systems, as some have proposed, would not be survivable against today's threat, let alone the likely one of the late 1980's.

Finally, let me address the administration's program for upgrading our strategic defensive systems. These forces and sensors have been virtually ignored for over a decade; as a result, we have large gaps in the North American air defense network, obsolete air defense interceptors, and anti-satellite and ballistic missile defense R. & D. programs that have fallen behind the Soviets.

Our program is multifaceted. It will improve air surveillance, in coordination with Canada, by deploying a combination of new over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radars and improved versions of existing radars, and development efforts toward more enduring sensors will be started.

We will replace five squadrons of aging F-106 interceptors with new F-15's and buy at least six AWACS aircraft for peacetime and wartime surveillance and interceptor control. We will continue to pursue an operational anti-satellite system. Finally, an expanded but cost-effective civil defense program will be developed in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

We will do those things for their own intrinsic merit and worth, Mr. Chairman. We will do them because ICBM's are a valuable part of the Soviet's equation of strategic forces, and we feel that we should have a similar or even improved capability.

In conclusion, not since the Eisenhower years has an administration proposed a strategic program of such breadth and scope. We believe we have used this unique opportunity to mold a strategic force that will meet the objectives of our strategy and serve as a coherent instrument of national policy. We believe our program will increase the incentives to the Soviets to seek meaningful arms reductions. Should they fail to recognize this opportunity, we will be in a better position to assure the country that our deterrent is strong and effective. These improvements will strengthen deterrence, for they will deny the Soviets any realistic prospects of gaining any advantage by initiating the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be happy to try to answer any questions you or the committee might have, as will my colleagues who are with me this morning.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the courtesy with which we have always been received by this committee.

Chairman Tower. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, these proposals are far reaching. We have a constitutional responsibility to review this matter. I, for one, have always believed it is the prerogative of the President to take initiatives on defense. I am aware of his constitutional position as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. As a matter of fact, I have always opposed congressional efforts to impose inhibiting restraints on the President in the use of his authority as the Commander in Chief. However, the Constitution devolves on us the responsibility for maintaining the military forces of this country. We are therefore partners with you in that endeavor.

In that connection, I ask you to express your willingness to permit your subordinates, both civilian and military, to give their best personal and professional judgments when called before the committee, even if in some instances they may not be compatible with the proposals you have made here today.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That assurance is understood, Mr. Chairman. There is no question about it.

Chairman TOWER. I appreciate that.

We would very much like to obtain the Townes Commission's report. None of us has seen a draft of it. We have some idea about what has been recommended. It is my understanding there is such a report. We would like it to be made available to this committee.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There are a number of documents, Mr. Chairman. They were all directed to, given to, and made for the President. I would certainly explore the possibility of getting at least some of that direct information to you. We will be glad to try to help all we can. They were, however, reports prepared specifically for the President.

Chairman TOWER. I understand that, Mr. Secretary, but you must appreciate the fact that what has been recommended here is the cancellation of an ongoing program which the Congress has studied for many years, and which was proposed both by the Ford administration and the Carter administration—I might say reluctantly by the Carter administration only after it had examined all the other options. I think it is important for us to know how the decision was arrived at and to be as much informed as possible.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will be glad to help as much as we can. I will say the Townes Commission, while they were divided on some points, were unanimous in the proposition that there was no way in which the United States could win a race with the Soviet Union that involved the MPS system. They phrased it this way: They said there is no way in which the United States can build shelters faster than the Soviets can build missiles. That was the essence of the basic disagreement that this administration had with an MPS system.

Chairman TOWER. You are not suggesting that the Soviets could accommodate such an increase in warheads or reentry vehicles at no costs at all to themselves?

Secretary WEINBERGER. At a cost that is so easily acceptable to them, Mr. Chairman. They are not constrained by any of the factors that are involved in an American decision on matters of this kind.

For example, the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union does not have to appear before anybody. While I am not recommending any change in our system, I point this out to you as an indication of how easy it is for them to decide how to build 10,000 or 12,000 missiles.

Indeed, their inventory is almost large enough now to take care of the MPS system proposed by the previous administration. That means we would have invested a large amount of our resources in a system that is no better than the one we already have.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, do you have a design for a 5,000 p.s.i. hardened silo?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is being developed.

Chairman TOWER. Do you have a design for it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Dr. DeLauer can answer that. If you are talking about final engineering paper, the answer is clearly no, because we are recommending it to the Congress. But there is an overall schematic kind of design. In that sense, I think it is ready.

Dr. DELAUER. Mr. Chairman, we have the basic criteria and some of the design parameters are pretty well in hand.

Chairman TOWER. Can you give us any cost figures, Doctor?

Dr. DELAUER. Not right now, because we have to see where the particular siting will be. They are pretty much site peculiar, as you do know.

On the other hand, the costs are going to be probably at the lowest level because of the fact that where we want to make initial deployment most of the infrastructure exists. So it is the replacement of the existing structure, existing capability, but all the ancillary and infrastructure that normally would have to be constructed in a new deployment——

Chairman TOWER. Can you give us a rough figure for the silos?

Dr. DELAUER. It is about a factor of two over the cost of what the existing Minuteman III silo costs.

Chairman TOWER. We would like to have those as early as possible. Obviously, that has to be considered in our deliberations.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have to have funding profiles on the program, and assumptions regarding the cost of those silos were included in our funding program.

We will give you the explicit numbers while we are working with your staff.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, how is this proposal going to affect the utility of the ballistic missile defense system? It is my understanding that the Townes Commission, or at least a substantial number of the members, felt that the best utility of a ballistic missile defense system can be achieved with a deceptive basing mode.

Absent a deceptive basing mode, how is BMD more effective in defending existing holes than it would be defending missiles configured in a multiple basing mode?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, most of the debates thus far have been assuming a ballistic missile defense system of the kind we could now have; that is, a system which, while it is about 50-percent effective or effective about half the time against the incoming missiles, is not the kind of system that we would feel warranted the expenditures or the problems involved in deploying it.

So what we are talking about here is immediately starting an intensive research and development effort using all of the very latest technologies that we have and some which are just on the horizon, some a bit over the horizon, to see if we can't get a more effective ballistic missile defense system.

The kind that we are hoping that we can ultimately adopt and perfect is a system that would not require a deceptively based or multiple-based system.

The other half of the answer is that one of the things we are looking at, after we get by this very dangerous mid-decade period, is for a more permanent method of deploying the MX, systems that would be deceptive in the sense that they could be part of an airborne continuous patrol or some of the other things I have outlined.

So, we think it is very important to pursue intensive research into BMD in the hopes we can get something far better than we have now.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, I still do not understand how the deceptive basing mode authorized by the Congress with the BMD could be more easily overwhelmed by the Soviets than what you propose. Why is what you propose more difficult for the Soviets to overwhelm than what we have already authorized?

Secretary WEINBERGER. For the period of time it would be in effect, the hardening of the silos would be such that they would have a greater survivability than the individual shelters of the MPS system, by a very large magnitude, 5,000 compared to 600 psi. We believe that this difference will complicate Soviet attack planning and reduce their confidence in the outcome of an attack. They would also have in them a very much stronger missile, and they would have a much better command and communications control network connecting them. All of these things would increase Soviet uncertainties about outcome of a first strike during a period of time when it is important that we enhance deterrence overall.

The MPS system of the previous administration would not have been fully deployed until 1989 or later. What we need is something immediately. We can't get it tomorrow, so we plan to pursue efforts that can give us the most effective strength as soon as we can get them; and that, is why in another connection, we are putting strong emphasis on immediate acquisition of a substantial number of cruise missiles.

Chairman TOWER. My time is up, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. I want to follow up on the chairman's question regarding the decisionmaking process.

What baffles me, Mr. Secretary, is that after 8 months of studying and doing all of these things we end up with a program that is the program that you and others have condemned; that is, you are putting the missiles back in these vulnerable silos.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, if you will permit me to say so, that is a totally incorrect characterization of what we have proposed. Maybe I should outline it again.

Senator JACKSON. No. All you are talking about is hardening fixed silos?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Some of them for a period in which we need additional strength as quickly as we can get it.

Senator JACKSON. My main criticism—and I criticized the Carter administration—is that in the 1980's Minuteman and Titan are vulnerable in those silos. I think you and others properly have criticized that deployment. Then after 8 months we come back here; we have looked at all these other things supposedly, but it took 8 months to do that, and we end up with what we have now.

Secretary **Weinberger.** No; it is not what we started out with, Senator.

Senator **Jackson.** We started with what we have now, the Titan deployment and the Minuteman.

Secretary **Weinberger.** It is not what we have now, Senator, the initial MX missiles are to be deployed in silos that are strengthened by a very considerable hardening effort. It is a far stronger and more accurate missile that will be located in such silos. That, in itself, should give considerable additional deterrence to the Soviets.

The other thing is that it is not a permanent solution; it is not presented as a permanent one. It is important not to wait until 1989 in order to fully deploy a highly vulnerable system at an enormous cost to our resources when we can do this that gives us added strength much sooner.

Senator **Jackson.** We have given the Soviets a better target to shoot at.

Secretary **Weinberger.** I don't agree with that.

Senator **Jackson.** You don't?

Secretary **Weinberger.** No, I do not.

Senator **Jackson.** Isn't the MX better than the Titan?

Secretary **Weinberger.** It is far better than the Titan. For that reason, they cannot have any confidence in launching an attack on it with impunity.

Senator **Jackson.** I don't follow that reasoning because it is clear to me that if you agree that 90 percent of Minuteman is now vulnerable, including Titan, it is clear that that percentage continues, except to the extent that you can harden against a direct attack.

Secretary **Weinberger.** That is a very big exception. It is something that we do not now have and it is something that will for a short period of time, the most critical and most dangerous time, increase our defensive strength.

Senator **Jackson.** But with their capability, with the SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's they can saturate the proposed MX sites without much trouble and, as I understand the administration's own position—and I share it—Soviet accuracy is virtually comparable to ours.

Secretary **Weinberger.** Soviet accuracy is very good. They do not, we believe, have the strength to do the things in the mid-decade that they can do toward the end of that decade. So, for a period when we can and have to have additional strength very quickly, we propose this raising plan.

Now, some people have said it is just a stopgap measure. I don't agree with that. If that is the characterization somebody wants to put on it, all I can say is that it is a very big gap and it is very vital to bridge it.

Senator **Jackson.** I am only using the administration's position, which I share, about the vulnerability of our land-based system. Once you agree with that assumption, which I do, then the only response that you can give is that you have hardened it against everything but a direct hit; and their ability to make direct hits, based on the administration's own assumption as to accuracy on a saturation basis, means to me that this system is not survivable as proposed.

Secretary **Weinberger.** Senator, I don't think at this point there is anything that one can guarantee as being perfect in the future. What we need to do is to get all the added strength that we can get as quickly as we can and, meanwhile, start the search for something that is even better. We have examined literally hundreds of possible options. We have reached the conclusion that there isn't any ground-based system that is survivable and therefore we are studying a number of other things that we hope can add to that.

We are not prepared to say today the continuous airborne patrol is the answer, but it has some very promising aspects.

The use of the south side of mesas or deep underground basing have some disadvantages; they have some arguments against them; they also have some promising arguments in their favor.

The development of a really effective ballistic missile defense which might solve the whole problem may be closer than we believe. We have to start working on it.

Meanwhile, we can't stand still. We can't take the MX missile as it comes off the production line and put it in the warehouse because we don't have a basing system finished. Therefore, we do the very best we can to get all the additional strength we can as quickly as we can get it.

This is only one part of a five-part program. There are submarines, cruise missiles, bombers, command and control and defensive forces. The concentration on this one small piece of a much bigger program, I think, distorts the value of the whole package.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, we all know what our problem is and it is substantially different from that of the Soviets. They have a thousand missiles, for example—purely illustrative—we have a thousand. Our problem is that our thousand have to survive or a percentage of them will have to survive so that they will provide a credible deterrent. Their planning is on a first-strike basis. All of our planning has been to absorb a first strike and then have credibility left over.

Secretary WEINBERGER. For a credible effective response, yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. I say credibility; that means credibility to our adversary. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that we are not meeting that test and that we do not have survivable systems involved.

I would like to find out who really made this decision and how it was made. Was this your recommendation? Was this the recomendation of the Joint Chiefs? Was this the recommendation of the staff to the President at the White House?

Secretary WEINBERGER. You are concentrating on recommendations. Your initial question is the easiest to answer. The person who made this decision was the man who was elected to make the decision. The President made the decision. He had many different kinds of options and different kinds of recommendations and suggestions.

Senator JACKSON. Did he buy your recommendation?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir. I was favorable to the plan that was adopted, and I made that as a recommendation, but there were many others before him and there were many who joined in this one.

Senator JACKSON. Did you recommend the proposal that is now before us?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You did?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. That was your No. 1 recommendation?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I don't want to give you any kind of incorrect assumption that I sat alone and put all this together and then took it over to him and he signed it. This was the product of a very large number of conversations and discussions ranging over the whole 8-month period that you mentioned. I would frequently discuss with the President on the telephone or in person and with groups or alone the various pieces of the whole program.

Senator **JACKSON**. Did the Joint Chiefs recommend the proposal which is before us?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. They recommended a large part of that which is before you. They do not recommend the particular piece—this one small piece—you are talking about, the silos, no, sir; but you should talk with them.

I put no restraints or any restrictions on their ability to talk to the committee.

Senator **JACKSON**. Mr. Secretary, you call this a small piece, but MX basing is not a small piece.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. It is a very good, improved missile. The basing of it for a, 2- to 3-year period strikes me, against the background of the whole program, as being a small part of one of the five pieces of the program, sir.

Senator **JACKSON**. Did you in effect punt?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. No, sir. You were not here when I gave my opening statement, but this is emphatically not a decision to wait or to do anything of the kind, or to punt, as you say. It is a decision to do something immediately, to do the things that will get us greater strength and, meanwhile, we will try to develop something that is far better than what had been previously proposed.

The MPS system with 200 missiles and 4,600 shelters was proposed as a permanent solution. We think it is not in any way feasible as a permanent solution, nor is 100 missiles in 1,000 shelters. We have an interim solution that will give us an added strength for a few years while we explore three or four very promising alternates and far more permanent solutions.

In the meantime, we add all the strength we can through the other five points of the program.

Senator **JACKSON**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **TOWER**. Senator Goldwater?

Senator **GOLDWATER**. I do not have anything for you, Mr. Secretary, except one little word: Forget the air-launched MX missile, please. It is dead.

Now, General Jones, the administration is going to cancel the KC-10 program. That leaves us with 600 KC-135's being reengined and that program is going very slowly. Is there any way that can be speeded up?

General **JONES**. Senator Goldwater, it is not constrained from a technical standpoint or production; it is a budgetary constraint that keeps the program from going to fruition earlier.

Senator **GOLDWATER**. It is restrained by money?

General **JONES**. Purely dollars, constrained purely by dollars, by money available.

Senator **GOLDWATER**. Mr. Secretary, do you know anything about that?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. Senator, the program that we originally had in the budget contained KC-10's and additional funding for the reengining.

When we agreed that we had to make some reductions in outlays—and the Chairman pointed out that this has a much bigger effect on authorizations, we looked through everything we were doing to try to find things that, while they weren't of lower priority and they were not unnecessary things, were slightly below some of the other things we were doing.

Faced with that requirement, we did make this change. When General Jones says it is solely budgetary and fiscal constraint, that is absolutely right. Nothing has changed in the way of the necessity, the threat, the need for it; but there has been a change in the perception that somewhat lowered overall governmental outlays, including defense, would perhaps assist in lowering interest rates.

We all want to cooperate in that.

Senator GOLDWATER. I would hope that we could put some more emphasis on it, because we have many KC–135's, as you know, that cannot take off with a full load.

One more question:

The Chairman tells me that you cut $570 million out of the KC–135 engine program?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know the exact amount, but we managed to take some part of the $2 billion reductions that we needed out of that program. It is a little less than that, but that is approximately right. It is over a 5-year period, of course. Our $2 billion problem was 1 year. We have a $5 and $6 billion reduction program for the next 2 years that we had to deal with.

Senator GOLDWATER. This is a very, very important part of any redeployment force. Right now we are not capable of rapid deployment at all.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I can't argue with you, Senator. It is difficult to find in the budget we submitted, things that are really subject to reduction. We have done our best to identify things that one way or another we feel we could perhaps defer a bit longer; and, as I said, the military need did not change at all during the time we submitted those programs. But a $13 billion cut, which is derided in some quarters as totally insufficient, means very real reductions in some of our planned improvements.

Senator GOLDWATER. General, are two E–4's enough for this country?

General JONES. E–4's?

Senator GOLDWATER. Like we have at Andrews Air Force Base.

General JONES. We have four now—one E–4B and three E–4A's, Senator Goldwater. I have recommended seven E–4B's.

Senator GOLDWATER. How about the EC–135's?

General JONES. We have a sufficient number, and in the program there is money to harden the EC–135's to electromagnetic pulse. They will be improved substantially. The current E–4A's will be updated to withstand EMP.

Senator GOLDWATER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I know that the President and you, the Joint Chiefs and others, have had many difficult decisions to make in regard to our strategic forces. I am pleased that decisions have been made. I have long been supportive of adding to the strategic forces.

I have long favored the MX. I must say I have been a little skeptical recently because there is no consensus as to basing mode. I think perhaps the President came up with probably as good a solution for the time being as you could get under the circumstances.

I am prepared to support your proposal.

Now, let me ask you this: Speaking now only of the MX missile and the basing mode, how does the cost of what President Reagan recommends compare with what President Carter recommended?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The proposal to develop 100 of the MX missiles and deploy some of them in the reconstructed silos is substantially less, probably about $16 or $17 billion less, than the Carter proposal.

Senator BYRD. That is over what period of time?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Over the period of time necessary to deploy it. The 200 missiles in the 4,600 shelters would not have been fully deployed until 1989. Our proposal to continue with the production, getting 100 operational MX missiles and finish deploying some of those in the reconstructed silos by 1986. We hope to have the MX missile in 1985 or at least some of them. So that our program costs would spread over roughly a 6-year period from 1982 to 1987 as opposed to perhaps close to an 8-year period for the other program.

Senator BYRD. The reduction in cost would be about $17 billion?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I may be off a little bit on that. Also, I should mention to you, sir, that included in the overall cost of our program, but not reflected in the savings I just cited, is the research and development, the beginning of the examination into the more permanent basing mode that we have indicated to the committee we want to look at, since we regard the basing of the MX missile in these Titan silos, or wherever they are ultimately put, as not in any sense a final solution; whereas, the MX system of the previous administration was proposed as a final solution.

Senator BYRD. I assume the cost you are speaking of does not include whatever cost might be involved in an ABM system?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; that would be separate, though some of the research in that system to determine whether or not there is not a far better system than we could have now would be part of this missile package.

Senator BYRD. When would you envision a recommendation in regard to an ABM system?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In the 1984 period. We want to make our recommendations for the more permanent basing mode for the MX at that time. Since that is one of the options that we would be examining, we hope to have all of them ready by 1984. That would mean that by the end of this decade, we could start to put in place not only a more permanent basing mode for the MX but also all the other things that we hope to do.

If an ABM system, far more effective than we have now can be developed, that is a very promising option.

Senator BYRD. I was fearful you might come up with an air-based or an air-launched system, which I would have found very difficult, if not impossible, to support.

So, I would like to second Senator Goldwater's comment.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are going to look at it. Obviously, if it is not promising—and at this state it looks like it might be—we will not bring it before you. We are not wedded to it, nor do we have any pride of authorship or anything of that kind. It has some very promising aspects. We want to explore them.

Meanwhile, we did not want to wait until we have completed examinations to acquire the additional strength we think we need. That is the reason for recommending the deployment of MX now.

Senator BYRD. I think it is important for a decision to have been made, which you, of course, have done. You mentioned this is one of five pieces of a program. Over what period of time will all five pieces be put into place?

Secretary WEINBERGER. With a start now, and we have much hope that we can begin this year, they should be initially in place by 1989 or 1990, including even some of the newest bombers, with more of those becoming available later in the 1990's. But the great bulk of the program, and all the things that will add enormously to our strength, should be initially in place before 1990.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary WEINBERGER. One of the frustrating things, I have to add, is the length of time all of this takes. For anyone as impatient as I am, Senator, it is a very long time, particularly when you are driven by the constant nightmare that we may not have enough time. That is why all these things seem so important to me to do as quickly as we can.

Senator BYRD. This recommendation you made over the weekend is something that can be done more rapidly than any others?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; they are elements of the whole program that can be done quickly. Acquisition of 3,000 cruise missiles can give us substantial added strength very quickly. That is why we want to do it. The MX missile will roll off the production lines in 1986; perhaps, with any luck as early as 1985. We want to have a place to put it other than in a warehouse while we wait for a basing system to be developed. That is why we want to start with strengthening the silos right now.

All of these things would then fit together. Almost each year we would add increasing strength. By the end of the decade we feel we would be in a very, very good position and meanwhile we would, by the very reason of such programs, enter any arms reductions talks from a much stronger bargaining position and with very much more of a chance of getting a really effective result.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. General Jones, to what degree were the Joint Chiefs consulted and able to participate in this decisionmaking process?

General JONES. Senator Warner, the Joint Chiefs as a body did not address the specific service programmatic issues involved in how MX should be based. We get in primarily from the operational and military consequences of decisions. We wanted to have strategic programs that would give us a better balance with the Soviet Union. We were concerned that we had leaned on our investments in the past for so many years.

We put first priority in C^3 and we applauded the actions on it and on modernization of the Triad.

The Chiefs are on record in support of MX in a survivable basing mode. We are still evaluating the details. We don't have all the cost information yet on all the specific programs. There are some differing views, so I would like the others to speak for themselves with regard to their views on the current program.

I had plenty of opportunity, with the Secretary in particular and in multiple meetings with the President, to express my views on the package, particularly on the ICBM issue and survivability.

I think it is no secret I recommended the MPS system as the best system to provide a survivable ICBM in the mid- to late 1980's.

Senator **Warner**. In other words, you are in disagreement on the placing of the MX missile in the silos? You would have preferred the MPS?

General **Jones**. Senator, the Commander in Chief has made his decision. I support that decision.

Senator **Warner**. I understand.

General **Jones**. I was unable to convince the Secretary or the President that the MPS was a survivable system. I remain to be convinced that the alternative will provide survivability. I found out some time ago it is more important for me to convince the Commander in Chief than for him to convince me.

Senator **Warner**. In summary, you feel you had adequate opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process even though part of the final program was inconsistent with your first recommendation?

General **Jones**. Sir, I think in all these kinds of issues, people would like to have more involvement—especially more involvement right at the last moment when decisions are being made. I would have a hard time complaining that we had no opportunity to make our recommendations, but we did not have an opportunity to go over this package in detail.

Senator **Warner**. Before it was finally announced?

General **Jones**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Let us go to one of the difficult questions and that is the advanced technology bomber and the B-1. They are going to be competing together in parallel for funds at a very critical time of our own national fiscal problem. If it is the wisdom of the Congress that we cannot afford the entire package, where would the B-1 be in terms of priority if something had to be cut?

General **Jones**. Senator Warner, I would not like to choose between these two programs. I think both are important.

Senator **Warner**. I am not suggesting between the two. Take all the five parts of this program. Assume we cannot afford all five parts or the magnitude requested by the President and we come down to simply dollars and we put the question to you, now, we cannot expend the totality of the dollars requested by the administration. The question I put to you is, what would be the first system or part of the system that you would recommend would have to be deleted; which is the lowest priority?

Chairman **Tower**. May I supplement your question?

Senator **Warner**. You may.

Chairman **Tower**. Or would you take it out of other programs and try to leave your strategic package intact?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Mr. Chairman, thus far in the reductions that we have been required to make to meet the reduced outlay goals, we have protected, we have left alone, essential strategic programs, indicating the enormous importance we attach to the whole strategic area.

It is, as I have said, well under 15 percent of the total defense budget in the next 5 years.

Senator WARNER. That is in your statement. I want to get expert technical views. If something had to go, which of the five parts would have to go?

General JONES. In my own view, I consider the MX in a very survivable mode to be extremely important to the security of the Nation. I remain to be convinced there is a survivable mode other than MPS. So, if forced with the difficult choice, B-1, ATB, and MX, I would put MX last under the current program slice.

Senator WARNER. B-1 would go ahead of MX?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. ATB ahead of MX?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Is that the MX system in the present basing mode recommended by the President?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator WARNER. If we shifted back to the MPS system or a variant of that?

General JONES. I don't think that is an option at all, so therefore it is a hypothetical question.

Senator WARNER. Except the chairman in his opening statement got a commitment, as I understand, from the Secretary that MPS would go back in as an option to be studied in the 1984 timeframe.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, Senator Warner. I would have been misunderstood if this is your understanding. As far as the President is concerned, as far as the administration is concerned, as far as I am concerned, we have made a flat recommendation that the MPS system, 100 in 1,000 shelters, or 200 in 4,600 shelters, will no longer be considered. It is not part of the strategic plan and it is not planned by the President or by me that it be reopened. That is a firm, final decision.

I regret very much being on a different side than the chairman, but the issue is the lack of survivability, the magnitude of the resources involved and the intention to make it either a permanent system or in the case of 100 in 1,000 shelters simply a building block for more of the same.

Senator WARNER. I thought you had opened that window just a crack?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir.

Senator WARNER. I stand corrected.

Secretary Harold Brown, your predecessor, said yesterday, "Hardening doesn't buy much if your hardened shelter is in the middle of a crater." Do you care to rebut that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Sir?

Senator WARNER. Your predecessor said yesterday that "Hardening does not buy much if your hardened shelter is in the middle of a crater." Would you care to rebut that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would rebut it in the sense I would say hardening does buy you something; it buys you a few years in which the Soviets could not be certain that there would be a crater there, even though we do know that the accuracy and strength of the Soviet missiles is being improved. A few years in this business, Senator, is an extraordinarily important thing, because it gives you the time to develop something more survivable—BMD, mobility—that would come with a continuous airborne patrol, perhaps the south side of mesas, any one of those options, and we may recommend in 1984 some or all of those.

We do acquire something very valuable by the recommendations that are before you; that is, a few years—nobody can give you exact months—a few years to make the outcome of a first strike more uncertain for the Soviets. That is worth a great deal.

Senator WARNER. My last question is on the BMD Treaty. How does this program, in your judgment, affect the decisions that we are going to be confronted with next year under that treaty?

Secretary WEINBERGER. So far it does not affect it at all, because what we are recommending is an intensive study of whether or not there is not a better BMD system than we have now. Depending on how that comes out, we may or may not want to recommend that we relook at that treaty.

If we get an effective BMD system, I would not hesitate for a moment to recommend any revisions that might be necessary. At the moment none are required because we are not proposing to deploy anything.

What is available is not good enough.

Senator WARNER. With the dispersal of MX to Titan or Minuteman silos, it certainly would require an adjustment in the treaty if you wanted to incorporate BMD?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If you want to incorporate existing BMD, it likely would. As I said, what we have is not effective enough. We want to see if we can find something better, and will undertake the process to discover that.

Senator WARNER. There has been a comparison made of this program with the program President Carter had when he left office. Is this program less costly than his?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, it is more costly because it includes many more things, all of them very vital, but spread over a 6-year period. It is affordable and it is within the strategic program outline that President Reagan set forth in March.

Senator WARNER. How near does the program comport with the overall recommendations of the Townes Commission? You indicated one part of it was in alignment?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Very closely. The Townes Commission had divisions within it. I don't think it is possible for any reasonable group of people to examine these vital issues without having somewhat differing views, just as the committee and others would have. But I would say there is a very large share of agreement in the final package with the proposals of the Townes Commission.

I personally, of course, strongly recommend the program as I strongly recommended it to the President, as I mentioned a moment ago to Senator Jackson. But the President himself made independent decisions and he made them over a long period of time after discussions regarding the individual pieces. What he was particularly anxious to have was a very comprehensive program that, taken all in all, would regain for us the strength that we should have now.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, at your confirmation hearing—I am quoting from an answer you gave to Senator Exon—Senator Exon's question was about putting MX in existing silos. You said:

> I think there are a number of alternatives I would like to look at. I would feel that simply putting it in existing silos would not; and two or three of the concerns I have, namely, that these are well known and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be.

Now, what has changed your mind?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Nothing has changed my mind. What I was talking about was permanent solutions and I don't think they can be hardened enough on a permanent basis to warrant putting them in fixed and known silos. I think they can be hardened enough to give added strength for a few years. I think those few years are very valuable.

Senator NUNN. How many years?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Three to four.

Senator NUNN. How long will it take to harden them?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We can have them hardened before the MX missile is ready to go in them. We won't get the MX missiles until 1985 or 1986.

Senator NUNN. In what year do you believe the hardening will no longer be effective?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know the precise month because I am not privy to the production schedules or research of the Soviet Union, but we are estimating 1987 or 1988. Whatever you gain in this period in the way of survivability or increased strength, I have to say to this committee, is worth it in view of today's conditions and the conditions we fear may be upon us shortly.

Senator NUNN. How much are we going to spend, in approximate ballpark figures, to harden those existing silos?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will have precise figures for you. The hardening of the individual silos is not a sensitive job.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any idea? Are we talking about $1 billion or $10 billion?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are talking about hardening 36 silos. I would much rather give you exact figures, Senator. It is not an inexpensive operation. Nothing here is. The question is how do you value what an additional 2 or 3 years' survivability, or as closely as we can get to survivability will provide us.

Senator NUNN. Is there any member of the Joint Chiefs that believes hardening these silos will give us additional survivability?

Secretary WEINBERGER. For 2 or 3 years it is my understanding some do, yes. It is important to note some of the Chiefs did not support the previous system, the 200 missiles in the 4,600 shelters.

Senator NUNN. That is true; there will always be disagreement.

General Jones, your opinion is that hardening these silos will not give survivability even in the period?

General JONES. Hardening to 5,000 psi gives some increase in survivability over 2,000 psi. It is still to be determined if it is a cost effective tradeoff. I reserve judgment on whether it will be wise to go ahead with the 5,000 psi hardening.

Senator NUNN. You have not seen any cost figures yourself?

General JONES. I have seen some estimates on the cost figures, but I would rather wait because they were very broad, not sanctioned by the Air Force.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, do we have cost figures now, or do we have a plan here that we have those cost figures for?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have some cost figures. You have to appreciate that developing the cost figures has some expense to it, too. What we are presenting to you is a proposal. We will have cost figures of a general nature. To get the final definitive figures and perhaps plans and specifications, the ready-to-build drawings, is certainly something that would have to await the formal approval of the Congress. But we will have reasonably good cost figures for the actual work.

The techniques, the technologies, the skills involved are known and it is a perfectly practical thing that can be done.

Senator NUNN. You realize our authorization bill is in conference?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. When do you think we will get the cost figures?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think we can get you some kind of estimates which we hope will be reasonably good in time for the conference committee to act. That is what we want.

Senator NUNN. That means in the next 2 or 3 weeks?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. We want to start the work as soon as we can, so that the hardened, strengthened silos will be ready when the MX comes off the production line.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago, as I understood it—maybe I misunderstood you—that this recent budget cutting involved no strategic programs; is that right?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is what we tried to do. We tried to protect the so-called strategic wedges in the next three budgets, 1982, 1983, and 1984, where reductions would have to be made, so that we looked elsewhere for the reduction outlays that are required.

Senator NUNN. Didn't you cut the number of B–52's being modified?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I suppose you could technically call that a strategic cut. What we did was recommend taking out of service earlier the oldest of the models of the B–52's but they will be replaced by the B–1, which is a vastly superior plane. At the time the recommendation to retire the oldest B–52's was made, as part of identifying the reductions in outlays. We did not have the authority to announce the formal decision with respect to the B–1.

Senator NUNN. We keep hearing 3,000 cruise missiles as part of this package. How many cruise missiles do we have planned in this timeframe for this package? What is the number of cruise missiles now compared to what it was?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would have to get that for you.

Senator NUNN. My understanding is the overall cruise missile program is being slowed down.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; there was not any suggestion of that. In this package there is an increase in the number of cruise missiles that is being recommended and we can get the exact number for you.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, that is contrary to my information. I would like to have that.

[The information follows:]

CRUISE MISSILE QUANTITY

[Deleted] PAA ALCMs are being recommended. This would equate to a total buy of over [deleted] including spares and missiles for operational test launches. The [deleted] compares with the previously planned total of [deleted].

Senator Nunn. Is it true that the Trident submarine program is also being slowed down?

Secretary Weinberger. No. The Trident sub program?

Senator Nunn. From the March budget, isn't the Trident submarine being slowed down?

Secretary Weinberger. No; there is one base in Georgia that is being postponed.

Senator Nunn. I am not talking about that. We have been in considerable detail on that. Isn't the Trident building program being slowed down?

Secretary Weinberger. Slowed down?

Senator Nunn. Yes.

Secretary Weinberger. I thought you said closed down.

Senator Nunn. Slowed down.

Secretary Weinberger. Only in the sense that we are now on a more realistic, realizable schedule of one a year. There was a previous schedule of one and a half a year. Since the first one is now over 3 years late, I didn't consider that schedule anything more than a piece of paper. When we have gone over the program with what is unfortunately the sole source for providing these vitally needed ships, we found that the schedule we propose is the most realistic schedule that could be kept. This schedule is not based on budgetary concerns, but rather constitutes an effort to get the Tridents out as quickly as we can and as effectively as we can and with as few delays as possible. This is a revised construction schedule, and in the sense that the previous paper plan said one and a half a year, and now we are talking about one a year, yes, you can say that the plan is a slow down from the previous piece of paper. But from the actual point of view of deliveries of effective submarines, I would not consider it that way.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Secretary, on the bomber question, can you say that the IOC on the B-1 is 1986?

Secretary Weinberger. Yes.

Senator Warner. And the IOC on the advanced technical bomber is 1989?

Secretary Weinberger. 1989, 1990. When I give you these dates, Senator, these are considered by some of my colleagues to be optimistic. What I am trying to do is work through a number of procedures that can bring them on line a little sooner.

I think 1989 to 1990, certainly 1990, is a realistic date.

Senator Nunn. Is there enough money in the budget request now to fund these two bomber programs?

Secretary Weinberger. It may be later in the 1990's before you get a full deployment of the ATB's, in terms of all that we would plan to order, but we do believe we can have some ATB's operational within the 1989, hopefully or 1990, period.

Senator Nunn. It is my understanding there is not nearly enough money in the budget to do that.

Secretary Weinberger. First of all, those budgets are not even submitted to you. In the budgets that we have developed and in the requests that we will be making for 1983 and 1984, there will be enough money to do that.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, just a couple of quick questions.

Secretary Weinberger in his oral statement—I don't think it was part of his written statement—said basically, "We are canceling a scheme"—talking about the MPS—"that we know is not survivable now." Do you agree with that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am sorry.

Senator NUNN. I am asking General Jones the question.

General JONES. Senator Nunn, under the projections as to Soviet missile availability in the late 1980's, early 1990's, we considered that the MPS would be survivable, that if they went beyond our production of missiles there were two options: One, probably the most effective, would be some ABM defense of the MX fields, or you could go to additional shelters. In my judgment, this scheme had the element of survivability in the basing system and the element of providing continuing survivability if the Soviets went beyond the number of missiles projected.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Weinberger also says, "The Soviet inventory is large enough now to take care of the MPS system." Do you agree with that?

General JONES. If they target most of their missiles at the 4,600 MX shelters, they could have a high probability of destruction; however, there are lots of other targets around the United States they would have to cover. It is my judgment it would not be effective for them to go after 4,600 separate points to try to destroy 200 missiles. However, there are differing views on this, and we were not able to prevail.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Since I was quoted, may I be permitted a couple of moments of response?

What we are talking about is an MPS system that becomes fully operational in 1989 and so what I was talking about is the projected Soviet capability as of that time, the number of missiles in their inventory at that time.

We have no reason whatever to suppose that the Soviets will stand still. Nothing else in their acquisition program has.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin by focusing on the MPS basing decision. I feel it is unsettling for me in the space of 10 months to hear completely contradictory testimony from the most respected and expert defense officials on the basing mode. It is an incredible thing. If we cannot make our decisions in Congress on the most important and vital and far-reaching and momentous matters on the basis of testimony from our defense officials, then on what can we base them? How do you account for this diametrically opposed testimony?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There are differing views on these very vital and important matters. I felt and the President felt that he had been selected, based on a number of reasons, a strategic package which will strengthen the defenses of the United States, defenses which we all agreed that the past administration had rather badly neglected. We felt that we should not simply and automatically accept all the recommendations or all of the suggestions that were held over from previous administrations.

The President has always had strong reservations about the MPS system, as he disclosed to the country many times all through the spring and the fall. I had those same reservations arrived at entirely independently. But that was not necessarily the point, nor was it that it had been developed by a previous administration. It was simply that, as Senator Tower pointed out, there were aspects of the plan that were not considered by the previous administration.

What we felt we had to do was take a full, completely independent, and as quick as possible, new look at this whole thing because of its enormous importance. This program, if it is done properly, will last us well into the next century. It is the first time any President has had the opportunity to strengthen all of the legs of the Triad at once.

It is I think essential that a decision of that magnitude be arrived at very carefully. The President felt that way and we studied it at length, a period of time which many said was too long. But we reached different conclusions, not on everything, it is a very big package, on this one part of a five-part program. We think in all candor that we should present those to you.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not saying you are wrong. It is just that it makes one wonder. In fact, I am glad to see this package. A plan is better than no plan. I am glad that we are going to see some action in place of rhetoric for a change.

Again referring to the ABM basing mode, you evidently have come to the conclusion that to build a MPS system would simply invite the Soviets and encourage the Soviets to build whatever number of warheads and boosters necessary to neutralize it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. More than that, it would give them confidence that they could do that. That is an extremely important part of strategic equation and necessarily would be an extremely important part of any attempt to secure a real reduction in arms, which is the President's goal.

Senator HUMPHREY. If you are right on that score, then our expenditure would be massive for 1,000 or 2,400 shelters and associated equipment and personnel, and would buy for us only an increased number of Soviet weapons pointed at us.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am very much afraid so, sir. That is why, after examining it from every aspect, we recommend to you that you not proceed with MPS basing and that it be canceled.

Senator HUMPHREY. I must say my initial impression is that this is a very good package. Obviously, there are good arguments on the MPS side connected with ABM and otherwise, the soaking up of warheads, if you will, on that score. How do you answer the argument that abandonment of the MPS system will free up Soviet warheads for other targets, including civilian targets?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They have unfortunately, Senator, a capability of attacking now and our targets capability will continue to grow since it is unconstrained, as I mentioned, by the things that constrain us.

I think they would have had enough warheads to destroy a 4,600 shelter MPS system and have some warheads left over by 1988 or 1989. The SALT Treaty, as you know, did not sufficiently limit the number of Soviet warheads at all after 1985. I think that we simply have to realize that they have, and have exercised the power, expanded their armed forces in all aspects, strategic as well as conventional, every year since 1961 and they are still doing it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you feel the Soviets will continue to go forward increasing the number of boosters or warheads even now that that decision has been made?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have seen nothing to indicate that they will stop. What we need is to regain the kind of strength that can begin to restore the balance so that we can feel some confidence, and so the Soviets would know that we do have the power to inflict unacceptably high damage to them and that we believe that this will deter them from striking. We feel this imbalance now, and if we do not take corrective steps now we will feel it particularly in the mid-decade, which is what makes it a dangerous period.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mentioned in your statement on page 8 that there will be initial deployment of MX, probably 36, in Titan or Minuteman III silos. Does that mean starting with number 37 of the 100 you would expect to have some new option available?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We hope to have recommendations to you in 1984 as to some better mode of deployment. We would expect to deploy all 100 missiles in one or more of these basing modes as soon as practical.

We think the initial deployment is essential, it is essential to get the MX missiles deployed and to bring them on line in silos that can be far more survivable than we have now or, indeed, what was proposed. That is the point of it. It buys some time in an equation that is of incalculable value for us.

Senator HUMPHREY. Incidentally, I don't want to contradict my friend and fellow aviator, Senator Goldwater, but I hope that you won't forget, as he put it, the airborne basing concept or any other because what we need is simply, and I am not telling you anything, but what we need is simply to induce enough doubt on the part of the Soviets that a first strike attack will succeed. Any way we can do that is fair game in my view.

I hope, though that while we don't want to waste time forever studying things, you won't rule out anything. Knowing you, I am sure you won't.

Let me talk, if I have time left, about the manned bomber business. At what point are you advised that the B-1 will no longer be capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think somewhere in the early 1990's, perhaps a little earlier. Again we don't know the ability or capability they will have to acquire which they do not now have or which they are now developing. After that it will have a very vital conventional role, and of course, as General Jones reminded me, at all times it will have the capability to deliver a standoff cruise missile capability, that is, it could deliver its cruise missiles without having to penetrate Soviet airspace.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is a rather swank manner for a conventional bomber?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is a very good machine, but we don't know that it is anything more than what will be needed for conventional warfare at that time. Of course, as I have said many times before, we will consider we have been completely successful if we never have to use any of these weapons.

Senator **Humphrey.** Yes. In what year do you expect full operational capability for the B–1?

Secretary **Weinberger.** 1986.

Senator **Humphrey.** I thought that was initial.

Secretary **Weinberger.** Oh, full?

Senator **Humphrey.** Yes.

Secretary **Weinberger.** I think the production line should go quite quickly once the first ones are delivered. As you know, a very large amount of work has gone into the basics of this airplane. While the B–1 variant that we are recommending does have new features, and change to the original version, I believe we won't see any production problems involved with it. In terms of fully deployed, do you mean all 100?

Senator **Humphrey.** Yes.

Secretary **Weinberger.** Late 1988. We get the first squadron in 1986. We have four prototypes now and a lot of work has gone into it. All of these things take longer than I think they should.

Senator **Humphrey.** So, it would be in service as a penetrating bomber for perhaps at most 5 years?

Secretary **Weinberger.** I think perhaps a bit longer than that. It is hard to tell. We do know the B–52 will not have penetrating qualities probably very shortly after the mid-decade.

Senator **Humphrey.** How effectively will be the B–1 be as a standoff missile carrier?

General **Jones.** Senator Humphrey, with regard to penetration, we found there is not a magic date. As they develop more capability our penetration probability goes down. We would expect that some penetration of the less dense defenses, however, would go on for many, many years.

Senator **Humphrey.** I understand. Can you give us an opinion on the effectiveness of the B–1 as a standard of cruise missile carrier? How close to optimum is this? Are we going to be using it for something for which it is not really designed, which seems to be characteristic of our programs?

General **Jones.** If you set out to design an airplane as a cruise missile carrier it would have many of the characteristics of the B–1. The B–1 is hardened to EMP, has some limited hardening to blast, and can escape via quick takeoff. It is much more effective than going to a transport like a C–5 because of its survivability. We have invested $6 billion in the B–1 in research and development. So, even if we were starting off to develop a cruise missile carrier, we are probably better off from a cost-effectiveness standpoint going to the B–1 than starting over again.

Chairman **Tower.** Senator Exon?

Senator **Exon.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like at this time to submit for the record and have printed therein statements that I will refer to and not read at this time regarding the MX basing mode:

By Secretary of Defense Weinberger on January 6, 1981; by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 28, 1981; by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Allen, on February 27, 1980; by General Allen again on January 29, 1981; by the Commander in Chief at that time of the Strategic Air Command, General Ellis, in February 1981; and lastly, by the Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff for

Research, Development and Acquisition, General Burke, on February 25, 1981.

[The statements follow:]

PREVIOUS TESTIMONY REGARDING BASING OF THE MX MISSILE

Secretary of Defense Weinberger (January 6, 1981): "I would feel that simply putting it (the MX missile) into the existing silos would not answer two or three of the concerns that I have; namely, that these are well-known and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be, to be of sufficient strategic value to count as a strategic improvement of our forces."

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones (January 28, 1981): ". . . all of the systems that have been discussed have some degree of mobility. If it is a vertical shelter, you can move it (the MX missile); therefore, it is mobile, but it takes considerable time to move it from shelter to shelter. If the system is horizontal, you can move it much faster; therefore, it is more mobile. We have advocated faster movement, so that if they (the Soviets) detect where the missiles are, we can move them more quickly."

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Allen (letter of February 27, 1980): "After exhaustive studies of some 35 alternative basing modes, the Air Force (supported by both the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and the Defense Science Board) concluded that survivability of the land-based ICBM force could best be provided by a system—known as multiple protective structures (MPS)—that bases a relatively small number (200) of missiles in a relatively large number (4600) of shelters."

"The purpose of adding mobility to the normal concealment mode is to deny the Soviets the prospect of executing a successful attack even in the unlikely case that they could gather sufficient knowledge of the location of a significant number of the MX missiles."

"The fundamental goal of MPS is to deter an attack by confronting the Soviets with a situation in which they would always have to use more of their force (at least 2.3:1) than they could expect to destroy."

"It would cost us less to respond to the increased threats than it would for the Soviets to deploy them."

General Allen (January 29, 1981): "They (the transition team) understood my views and the Air Force's views. Those views are that an essential feature of the MX deployment is that the basing mode be survivable. One does not obtain that through placing it in the Minuteman silos. Therefore, I do not favor such a deployment."

Commander-in-Chief (at that time) of the Strategic Air Command, General Ellis (February 18, 1981): "We must correct our vulnerability by deploying the MX in a mobile basing configuration."

"Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) basing will guarantee future adaptability to unpredictable threats and, as a complement, the ability to rapidly reconfigure or reposition the entire force if an attack is imminent—a capability not achievable with silo-based missiles."

"It is a matter of national urgency that MX in the MPS basing mode be kept on schedule. Interruptions or delay in its development and acquisition will leave a void in our strategic capabilities."

"Senator, if we had the mobility in the Minuteman force that we are building into the MX force we wouldn't need an MX force."

General Allen (February 25, 1981): "Now we have, over the years, examined any number of ways to improve the Minuteman force. We have looked at bigger missiles; we have looked at increasing the hardness of the silos; and we have looked at very deep silos, tunneling out silos, silos on the backsides of hills; and we have looked and concluded that there really—with the accuracy which we are certain the Soviets have in their systems and the numbers of weapons which we will be able to apply to the problem, that it is futile to attempt to build an invulnerable silo."

"So we came to the conclusion very early that mobility or concealment were essential characteristics of achieving the survivability that we had to have."

Deputy Air Force Chief-of-Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition, General Burke (February 25, 1981): "You can look at impervious silos, more concrete, or putting them in south slopes of mountains, and no one was ever able to develop confidence we could do that."

"(Complete MX deployment in addition to the Minuteman force) Indefinitely, sir, and that would depend on what world of assumptions you would make about further SALT limitations and what will be allowable levels. But under current planning there is no projected end to the Minuteman force."

"The most encouraging part (of this section of the chart) is that the MX in a properly designed MPS system can be expanded to counter any increased Soviet threats. We can do that at a cost somewhat less than the Soviets would have to spend for that threat, and I think if at the outset we make it clear that we are building the MX in this system to respond to a posed Soviet threat, and we have both the capability and the will and indeed the determination to match any future threat, we ought to discourage them from wasting money trying to threaten us in the future."

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up on what Senator Nunn brought up, harkening back to your confirmation hearing on January 6, 1981.

Before that you and I had had some private conversations on this matter that I don't care to get into here. But in response to my question that Senator Nunn referred to I am going to quote it once again and the last part of that which he left out which I think is critically important to the decisions that we are trying to reach here as to what the recommendation of this committee will be.

You said in response to my question about putting the MX in fixed silos:

> I would feel that simply putting it into existing silos would not answer two or three of the concerns that I have; namely, that these are well known and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be.

And get this part of your quote,

> To be of sufficient strategic value to count as a strategic improvement of our forces.

Are you now telling us, Mr. Secretary, that your decision now is an improvement in our strategic forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. For that same period in time that I testified to all morning, it is. It is not a permanent solution. I certainly took your questions to mean whether that should be the way we permanently deploy the MX. I don't think it is the way we should permanently deploy it. I think it buys us some extremely valuable time for the few years when we most need it.

Senator EXON. Let's go into that a little bit more. My question was not in regard to the permanency of this. You indicated earlier in your testimony that you felt that when the MPS system was originally suggested by the Ford administration, finally decided upon by the Carter administration, that it was told as the bottom line, the ultimate in defense.

I don't ever remember during the 2½ years that I have been here that anything that we propose today, and I suggest none of the things that the President and you proposed in the package last Friday, is to be guaranteed as 100 percent sure that it would be survivable under all conditions because I don't think you or I or anyone else knows what the Soviets might come up with.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is always that possibility. What I was talking about when I said the MX and the MPS system, the 200 in the 4,600 shelters, was proposed as a final solution I meant that it was accepted as the best way to go at that time, and there wasn't anything else as a followup nor was there any indication that anything would be done to deploy the MX missile in any other way.

Now, what we are talking about and what we are asking is to get started with the hardening process right now to buy us a few more valuable years while we are looking at three or four very promising methods for more survivable deployment modes for that missile, meanwhile doing a great many other things that were not suggested by the previous administration.

Senator EXON. You are telling me again here today that when you said here on January 6 that "putting the MX in these fixed silos would not be of sufficient strategic value to count as a strategic improvement of our forces," you think it is the way you advance it now?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir. For a few short years.

Senator EXON. For a few short years? When is the window of vulnerability?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The window of vulnerability is roughly about the mid-decade, as I said in my opening statement.

I can't give you the month when it will open and the month when it will close, but the simple fact of the matter is that because of several years of neglect we are not now taking delivery of things that we should have. Because of that we must now have both an interim and as near a permanent solution or ultimate solution as we can devise.

The point that you are talking about, which as I have characterized it, is one small part of a five-part program, is designed to buy us some time during a critical period which I estimate roughly as somewhere in the 1984, 1985, 1986 period, when the balance will be more favorable to the Soviets and when the Soviets would therefore have more of an invitation to think that their first strike would not be met with the unacceptably high cost of retaliation.

So we want to do everything we can now to narrow that gap and to close that gap. We have to do things that we can bring on line immediately. I would have much preferred, for example, to have had the B-1 in 1977 but we don't have it. We are not taking delivery in the next 3 or 4 years on very many things while the Soviets do have significant capabilities and they are adding to them all the time.

So, that makes what you can call interim solutions or stopgaps, if you want to use that term, I don't, but it makes things of that kind enormously important and important to do right now. They are not permanent solutions. Everybody recognizes that ultimately the Soviets would have enough strength in their missiles, and enough accuracy, so that these silos would not be as survivable as they should be, this will not be so for a few years, and I think that is a very valuable amount of time to buy.

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, I must pursue this line of questioning. I came here 2½ years ago and I was not convinced at that time that we needed or could afford an MX system. Since that time I have been barraged as a new member of this committee with testimony from previous administrations, with testimony from the highest officials of our Defense Establishment, from innumerable closed door sessions with the CIA, that lead me to believe that indeed there was a window of vulnerability that likely we could not have a chance of closing unless we went to the MPS-based MX.

Do you believe I was misled by all these gentlemen?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think you were misled but I think it is inevitable there will be different viewpoints. The President was elected in November. He made no secret of the fact that he opposed MPS from the beginning, and has publicly opposed it all over the country. I heard at least 10 speeches in different parts of the country setting forth substantially the answer why he felt then and feels now, that this is not a survivable system worth the investment that is required for it. It does not buy as a permanent solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability, and it uses up the resources that would be available for other systems.

I don't think you were misled but there are different viewpoints. I heard a lot of the same arguments. I did not accept them. I don't believe I was appointed by the President to simply sit down and check "yes" on every recommendation that is made to me. That is the reason we are here today. Now, reasonable men can differ about these things and we certainly will have disagreements. I heard one person over the weekend expressing enormous alarm because there was going to be a debate about this subject. We welcome debate. We think it is essential that we do make decisions and start now because we did have a number of years when all we did was debate, with the result that we have very little coming on line.

Senator EXON. You do not mean to imply that because the President of the United States during a campaign made certain commitments that he has to carry all of those out when it comes to national defense?

Certainly the President has changed his mind on social security and he made firm commitments on that. We are talking about something that is very vital.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is right. I am not talking about the fact that the President feels that because he said something in the campaign he has to carry it out, although I will say a lot of people, particularly abroad, regard him as unique in the number of promises that he is keeping. We certainly are not going to get into a discussion of social security today because that is a much longer subject.

Senator EXON. Much tougher.

Secretary WEINBERGER. What I was saying is that this President believed then and believes now, and he disclosed to the country fully his belief that this system, which, as you say, was supported by a number of people, is not anything that is, to be perfectly frank about it, worth buying. That is a view which he held. He did reexamine it very carefully. It is one of the things that took a lot of time. I did not find anything that would lead me to the conclusion that I could conscientiously recommend to him that he was wrong. I don't think he was wrong. I think he was right about this then and is right about it now.

Senator EXON. I echo the sentiments of some of my colleagues' statements that have been made, and I congratulate you for that. I still maintain, though, that I suspect that this decision may have been more political than military.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I wish I had 5 hours to argue with you on that because that is absolutely wrong. The perception seems to be that because the President is a very good friend of the Senator from Nevada, that this motivated the whole thing. What does not seem to be remembered is that the same Senator from Nevada, unhappy as he was with what it might do to his State, was perfectly willing to accept the decision like this if it were in the national security interest.

We took the position very strongly, as the President did long before the election, that MPS wasn't in the national security interest. It was not a politically motivated decision. It would have been far easier for me to come up here in February and say, "Yes, that is what everybody wants, that is the way to go and now we will get on to something else."

We did not think in a matter of this importance we should do that. Also, we did take some time and reached conclusions that differ from those of a number of people whom I also respect.

Senator EXON. I guess I was not thinking particularly of my friend and colleague Senator Laxalt. I was thinking about the answer to the question asked by Senator Humphrey or Senator Warner when they indicated that as long as this is a stopgap measure—which I don't like to call it but I think from the testimony here today that is what it is—why would you not be willing to consider all future deployments including MPS, if necessary?

Have you closed the door on that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have examined that carefully and concluded that it is not a survivable system. The Townes Commission said there is no way we can build shelters faster than they can build warheads and we gain nothing by the expenditure of a vast amount of resources for that, so we turned to something else. We have an initial program that gives us a few years. If it is a stopgap, it is a very big gap and it ought to be stopped at once.

Meanwhile we will look at three or four other options that sound more promising.

Senator EXON. Don't you want to correct the record by saying that this is a small part of the window of invulnerability? Isn't it a big major one?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir. It is a small part of a very big program to close the window. We have not mentioned the submarine which is the most survivable of all our missile deployments. We have not mentioned the new plane which has both cruise missile launch and penetrating qualities. We have not mentioned the strategic defenses. We have not mentioned perhaps the most important thing of all, the ability to command and control whatever we have. Yes, I do insist this is from our point of view in a huge program, and in the kind of global context we are talking about, a comparatively small part of a very large program. It is only one piece of five pieces.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I am getting under some severe time constraints. I am due to meet the President in about 10 minutes.

Chairman TOWER. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary. I was given to understand you could stay until 12:30. Can you come back this afternoon?

Secretary WEINBERGER. At 1:30 I am due before your colleagues on the House Appropriations Committee. While I certainly intend no discourtesy, I would be worried about their reaction. We could perhaps run a few minutes more, although I have tried to make it a practice of not keeping the President waiting too long.

Chairman TOWER. Could you go through Senator Cohen's questioning? I hate to do this to my colleagues from Michigan and Alabama. However, we would like to have you back.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I can stay a few minutes more. I will certainly come back any time the committee wishes.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. In the past administration part of the difficulty—and I say this to General Jones who was partaking of decisionmaking during that time—one of the difficulties this committee had was trying to separate the military decisions from the political decisions. In fact, things got so bad before this committee that at one point we wanted a closed session and put all members of the Joint Chiefs under oath, not because we did not believe what they were telling us but because we wanted to protect them from any kind of repercussion that might come from the administration.

Now I would like to know, for example, what has taken place over the past 3 years that we have been sitting on this committee to go from the vertical MPS, which the Air Force by the way said in December 1978 was the best, most cost-effective, cost-efficient way to go. Then in 1978 we were told, "Well, we are not so sure about that any more. Let's go to the air-launched MX and we need $2 million to explore that."

Then we came out with a racetrack, which included the quonset theory, then it turned into a trench system with a sunroof and a modified shell game which the Carter administration supported.

At that time General Jones indicated he supported that, and does today, before this committee, for which I will commend him on that particular aspect. What has taken place between those military recommendations and what we have now with the Townes Commission, I don't know what that report says but it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we should not tolerate a situation that a military decision is based upon a report the summary of which we are getting, the conclusions of which are suggested here but we don't have an opportunity to review.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you will have an opportunity to review it. It was a report made directly to the President and it is in a different category. I don't feel I have authority to release it. This decision was not based on solely that at all. That was again one small piece, to quote a phrase, of a much larger decision process. All the changes you suggested took place and they did take place, all of those simply demonstrate there is not anything sacrosanct about the 200 missiles in 4,600 shelters system.

All kinds of opinions change and all kinds of different options are presented and proposed. I even had a proposal to put the missiles on the Amtrak system as the best way of confusing everybody as to where they were.

Senator COHEN. I understand the military decisions have not changed but rather the administration's positions and conclusions have changed. I believe you pointed to the Defense Science Board. In August the Defense Science Board recommended continuation of the MPS system combined with BMD overlay as being the most cost-effective and most effective way of going.

What has taken place since August?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The BMD overlay is not all that effective as they were the first to recognize. As I said in another connection, that is one of a few leagues in which a batting average of 50 percent is not enough. We have looked at that. We will need to take another look at BMD, but we want to develop a BMD system, if we can, and I hope we can, that will be far more effective than an MPS overlay. If that happens then the fact that targetable fixed silos are in place may not seem nearly as disqualifying as it does now.

Senator COHEN. Let me read from the Soviet military power statement. On page 56 there is a statement, talking about RV variance, especially SS1B, "When used in pairs against a single target the warheads are even more destructive. Single RV versions of the SS1B with their large destructive power and accuracy are capable of destroying any known fixed target with high probability."

Later, on the same page: "We expect improvements leading to new missiles and modification of existing missile systems. These improvements are expected to continue the trend toward greater capability against such hardened military structures as ICBM silos."

Secretary WEINBERGER. These are mixtures of projections and current capabilities. We go back to the point that we believe that the hardening, to the extent of 5,000 pounds per square inch, of some of the silos into which we would deploy some of the MX missiles as they come off the line would get us a few more very valuable years.

We obviously are all hoping and we obviously are all basing our views on projections that we have to operate from. Certainly it is not proposed as a permanent system or as a final solution as we think the MPS system in its final form was proposed and I think there were at least three of the proposals during that administration. We don't propose it that way.

What we say is that we will gain a few years, they are very valuable years, it is big gain. Meanwhile we will develop something that we believe will be far stronger than what had been previously suggested.

Senator COHEN. I assume by the statement on page 56 saying the destructive power of the SS-18, not to mention what we are talking about, two or three missiles against one target, is capable of destroying any known fixed target with high probability, you do not include in that fixed target hardened silos?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not immediately. Within a few years. We don't know the month or the date but not immediately.

Senator COHEN. As I understand it also, the IOC of the MX is 1986. You may have the hardened silos by 1987?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; we would hope, if we can get started this year, to get the hardened silos ready by the time the first MX comes out.

Senator COHEN. General Jones, you indicated you would place the B-1 at the top of your list, given a choice?

General JONES. I did not say that, Senator.

Senator COHEN. As I recall, Senator Warner gave you a choice of B-1, ATB and MX. You said you would put the B-1 at the top.

General JONES. I said I would put MX last. I did not differentiate between B-1 and ATB. I would go with both of those. I did not line those two up. I put MX last.

Senator COHEN. Of the three he gave you a choice. He said MX, ATB or B-1. You agreed you did not want to make the choice but if forced to make the choice you would go B-1.

General JONES. I did not say that. I said I would put MX last.

Senator COHEN. What does that mean?

General JONES. That means MX last.

Senator COHEN. That is the lowest of your priorities.

General JONES. On the question of the three I would have the MX last. I would put equal priority on B-1 and ATB but definitely ahead of the MX.

Senator COHEN. It is a tie between the two?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator COHEN. Let me go back to June 16, 1980 when you and I had a colloquy. I asked you, knowing you had long been a supporter of the B-1, if you were given a sum of money and even an unlimited budget, whether or not you would advocate the resurrection of the B-1. Let me read your response on page 36 of our hearings. You said:

> I would prefer having the B-1. The question is right now would I put the money in the 1981 budget with the first concurrent resolution. The No. 1 answer would be no because I have higher priority on readiness in some other areas.

In response to Senator Warner in the hearings of 1981 the same question was asked:

> In summary, with the advance in technology on cruise missiles you would not go to the B-1 but put these dollars elsewhere?
>
> Is that the same answer?
>
> General JONES. Yes, but I don't want to apply them against the B-1.

Senator COHEN. In every case you put a lower priority on the B-1 if you had to operate within certain budget constraints.

General JONES. As I understand it, Senator, the chairman of this committee would be proposing budget cuts and the likelihood there would probably be more on the Senate floor and House floor would put us even or slightly above the Carter administration's proposed budget, why has the B-1 suddenly been elevated to a higher priority than the——

We are talking now substantially more money in the budget than we were looking at, for example, in June of 1980 and readiness still continues to be my No. 1 concern. It is No. 1 priority. We do have within the budget a substantial increase in readiness. If there is a major reduction in authorization authority I would take a look at the B-1 but it would not be one of the first things I would look at but I would protect most items on readiness before almost anything.

Senator COHEN. You would still go to readiness over the B-1 given the fact you in the past supported them? I asked the question to find out exactly what your commitment was to the B-1. You indicated it was initially a mistake to cancel it. Given the budget restraints you have you would not recommend reviving it?

General JONES. At the time in question, that would put a tremendous deficit in readiness. We have since made up much of that. I do not mean I would not recommend, if we had some new constraints, some dollars for B-1 instead of readiness—because you don't have to take care of everything in your first priority before you go on to something else. But I still put readiness as the No. 1 priority.

Senator COHEN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Again I want to apologize to Senator Levin.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Maybe I should try to take Senator Levin's questions.

Chairman Tower. We have 20 more minutes of questions because we have Senator Levin and Senator Denton to go. I think this still will not finish the matter. Therefore, if I could get you to come back at a time mutually agreeable.

Secretary Weinberger. I can come back any time the committee wants. I have a hearing tomorrow but whenever we can open up a date that is not filled by some of your colleagues, I will be delighted to come, sir.

Chairman Tower. I understand, Mr. Secretary, that in a democracy it is difficult for a department head to do his job.

Secretary Weinberger. No, I am delighted to come any time you want me.

Chairman Tower. Why don't we then have you back and the first questioner on your return appearance will be Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. If the Secretary is willing to stay today I would just as soon be the last questioner today.

Chairman Tower. How long can you stay?

Secretary Weinberger. I can stay another 5 minutes.

Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, you testified that the permanent MPS is not survivable, therefore is not worth the money. I have to agree with the conclusion.

The next question we face is whether the temporary hardening of those 100 missiles is worth the money. You said it gives us a precious 2 or 3 years. At another point you said 3 or 4 years.

Secretary Weinberger. I guess my trouble is I am not able to fix the date when the strengthened Soviet capability will be deployed. So I am going to ask for a little latitude on that.

Senator Levin. The cost of this proposal of yours on MX is substantially less than President Carter's. You said $16 billion less over a period of 6 years.

Secretary Weinberger. The portion that is going into our proposal includes many other things.

Senator Levin. Can you tell us approximately what this temporary hardening is going to cost?

Secretary Weinberger. I can in a day or so when we get better estimates.

Senator Levin. You say you have considered the cost?

Secretary Weinberger. Yes.

Senator Levin. What cost did you consider? What assumptions did you make? Give us that assumption.

Secretary Weinberger. We assumed that the hardened silo will cost more than the MPS shelter. Also you will have 36 as opposed to 4,600. So we have a pretty good idea it will cost quite a lot less. The exact figures, which I know you will want and which if I give an approximation today, you will read from my testimony in a week and say it is all wrong, I don't want to give yet because I don't have them. It is not that I am trying to hide them. It is because we don't have them. We do know that hardening 36 existing silos will cost vastly less than the construction of 4,600 shelters.

Senator Levin. You estimate a total of $150 billion in this package.

Secretary Weinberger. $180 billion.

Senator Levin. What portion of that $180 billion had you estimated is represented by the hardening of these silos?

Secretary **Weinberger**. That I can give you.

Senator **Levin**. How did you reach the $180 billion?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The $180 billion is reached by estimating the total cost of all pieces of the program over a 6-year period and trying to include all of the things that are needed. One of the things in the ICBM portion of the program is research and development into new and better deployment sites, and the other is some of the actual start on some of those on sites and the production of the MX missile itself.

Senator **Levin**. The $180 billion was at least reached by adding some figures. I want to know in that total what figure was assumed for the missile hardening.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I have a figure given me for the whole program, spread over a 6-year period, but I don't have the item that you want, the specific item on how much is the hardening of the 36 silos, if that indeed is the number we ultimately go with. That is another variable.

There has not been a final decision as to how many should be hardened. We have taken 36 because the Titan missiles come in flights of 18 each and that would be two flights of the empty Titan wings after we retire the Titan from service.

Senator **Levin**. You reached the conclusion that it is worth a few years of extra time highly valuable to deterrence. You have not made any assumptions as to what the 2 or 3 years would cost us. Since you have issued a figure of $180 billion you must have added some figures together and there must have been a figure there for the hardening of the 100 silos.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We added what we believe to be the total cost of the ICBM portion of the program. I will get broken out for you, in 2 or 3 days, the precise cost figures to the greatest extent we can do it for the hardening of the 36 silos. There is no intention to do anything other than to give you accurate information, sir.

Senator **Levin**. My 5 minutes is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Tower**. Mr. Secretary, thank you. We will be in consultation with you on a date for future appearance.

The hearing is recessed subject to notice.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m. the committee was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

MODERNIZATION OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1981

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in open session at 10:09 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 1318, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Warner, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, Denton, Stennis, Nunn, Hart, Exon and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Michael B. Donley, Robert S. Dotson, Ronald F. Lehman, David S. Lyles, E. George Riedel, Kathleen Troia, professional staff members; Ralph O. White, Jr., research assistant; and Carol J. Rudolph, staff assistant.

Also present: Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Paul Schreiber, assistant to Senator Denton; Don Imgram, assistant to Senator Quayle; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Tower. The committee will come to order.

Today we welcome back Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Chairman Jones and Dr. DeLauer for a continuation of our hearing on October 5 regarding the administration's strategic force modernization program.

Since the announcement of that program by the President and the previous appearance of the Secretary, this committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces have been conducting intensive hearings on the programmatic, budgetary and doctrinal questions involved in the President's decision. Thanks to Senator Warner and his subcommittee, this will be the 12th session.

Other congressional panels have also held hearings. A great deal of information has been received and a great deal more is expected when questions submitted for the record are answered.

I would like to be able to report that all of the uncertainties and doubts that many Members have expressed about various aspects of the new strategic program have been dispelled in this process, but unfortunately I cannot yet do so. If anything, our hearings, reports and testimony provided the committee have raised additional concerns while failing to allay some existing ones.

In general, the impression has been left that many important aspects of the President's strategic modernization agenda are as yet undefined or undergoing continuing review or are subject to considerable debate and confusion within the executive branch.

For example, different assessments of the cost, operational concepts and earliest mission availability of the B-1 bomber have been presented to this and other committees. The scope, expense, location, effectiveness and purpose of a plan to superharden sites to house the MX are still unclear.

The technical feasibility and military viability of the long-term solutions to MX survivability presently under consideration are in question. The net effect of near-term reductions in strategic force structure justified on budgetary rather than military grounds remains to be fully assessed.

The assumptions behind the calculations that this program significantly improves the U.S. strategic posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and vis-a-vis the previous strategic plan remain to be adequately defined.

In short, Mr. Secretary, I urge you to make the most of your appearance here today and clear the air concerning these highly important issues, to allay concerns that exist about some of the decisions involved, and to set the stage for the constructive consideration of the President's program by this committee and by the Congress.

In addition to reviewing further details concerning the strategic modernization package, we have asked the Secretary to be prepared to respond to questions concerning the priorities and rationale applied by the Department of Defense in making the budget reductions required by the September budget review.

In my view, the magnitude of the proposed reduction was not justified on military grounds. We accepted the reductions for budgetary reasons. I might say that we have accepted it reluctantly and some of the members of this committee are still unprepared to accept it, and I think we will have more to say later on before the Senate. I am not speaking just for myself but some other members.

However, to the extent that such reductions become necessary, we would prefer to take them out of foreign commitments and force structure and try to project readiness and modernization as much as possible, which I believe is consistent with the basic thrust of the recommendations made by the Department.

I must stress that we are all concerned about the impact of these reductions, especially now that additional reductions are contemplated in some quarters, largely congressional quarters, I might add.

Certainly, I think this committee is firm on accepting no more reductions. Some restatement of the administration's priorities and intentions appears both necessary and desirable.

Mr. Secretary, we will permit you to proceed as you see fit this morning.

There are two of our members who were precluded by time restraints from asking questions at our last general session. I will call on them first, after you have made your presentation.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPER WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. DAVID JONES, USAF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND DR. RICHARD DeLAUER, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We are delighted to be back and to have the opportunity to complete the hearing, and we would certainly want to, as you suggest, make the most of our opportunity, and we will do our very best to do so.

I would suggest, respectfully, that some of the uncertainties that you mentioned as being in the minds of some members of the committee and Members of Congress may stem more from disagreements with the decisions rather than uncertainty as to what they actually entail. We believe we have made and we certainly will try again this morning to make clear all the things we hope to do, and the costs so far as we have them now, and also the results of some of those proposals.

I do agree completely with you, and we said so at the time that the reductions were made earlier in the year that they were not in any sense based on military grounds. This was understood and accepted by the President and everyone. They were based on fiscal grounds and they are reductions which we felt, since the fiscal grounds required it, could be made.

But we share with you the concern that additional or deeper reductions might now be suggested by others. I think that would do substantial damage both to the perception of America's regaining its strength and the actuality of our regaining strength.

During the period of time since we met last, just a month ago, I have been very heartened by the degree of support and enthusiasm for the overall strategic program that I sensed from my colleagues in the NATO Alliance.

We have had the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Scotland since our last meeting. I briefed them on the details of our strategic program. They expressed their unanimous support for the determination of the United States to assure the deterrent capability of our strategic forces whose importance to the overall defense of the alliance is critical. They are aware of the fact that we have in the United States maintained that nuclear shield ever since the end of World War II, and that our new program evinces a very clear intention and determination not only to maintain it but also to modernize it, strengthen it, and keep it in balance with those of our possible adversaries.

Also, I have been very heartened by the degree of support and enthusiasm with which the overall program has been received by military leaders and by many others. There have been individual discussions and problems with one or two of the details of the program, but overall this is a very comprehensive program for revitalizing our whole strategic deterrent force, with five mutually reinforcing parts with which you are familiar. It is heartening, I think, and encouraging, to find the degree of support for the magnitude, the scope, the sweep, and the overall effect of that program.

There are a couple of aspects of the program that have attracted a tremendous amount of attention in recent weeks. These are the interim deployment of the MX missile in hardened silos, and the cost of the B-1 bomber.

It is surprising to me that there has been very little discussion of the importance and the perceived need for improving strategic command, control and communication; strategic defenses; sea-based force strengthening; and the addition of cruise missiles.

I suppose the fact that there has been essential unanimity on all of these important aspects takes the matter out of the possibility of being discussed further, and I would take it that that is heartening, too.

With respect to the MX missile and the existing Minuteman or Titan silos reconstructed for increased hardness, we are reviewing now the Air Force proposals that have been made. Selection of one or more of the initial MX basing sites will, of course, depend on many factors, such as the ability of the soil to take the hardening, costs, scheduling, operation, and various other technical considerations such as compatibility with possible later deployment of a BMD should we get a better system than we have now.

Dr. DeLauer is with me today and can assist in the additional technical details, cost factors, and other details in which you might be interested.

We have a number of plans. When we say we have not selected a specific plan, that does not mean that the basic part of the program is uncertain in any way. It means the particular silos that are to be hardened out of the 36 to 40 that we have been talking about may not have been fully selected because the soil studies have not been completed or additional cost factors have not been obtained in detail.

But basically our current estimate for the total basic related cost of employing 40 of the missiles in the Minuteman silos—and again it is not a firm decision necessarily to deploy 40 as opposed to 36—but that basic cost would be $5.6 billion in fiscal year 1982 dollars. Costs are estimated at $7.8 billion to put some fewer missiles, 36, in reconstructed Titan silos because of the additional cost associated with MX deployment in those silos.

This would include all the basing related costs—research, development, testing, procurement, facilities, equipment, and construction. Only about $800 or $900 million, again depending on which particular ones are chosen, of this total is associated with increased hardness. The increased hardening does provide some additional protection and the cost for moving it up from 2,000 to 5,000 psi is between $800 and $900 million.

This would include some testing, hardening of the launch equipment, facilities, and silo construction. Silo construction costs for hardening alone are estimated at $10 to $20 million per silo. We believe silo hardening is both feasible and supportable.

It has been said we don't have a detailed plan, meaning we have not picked out which particular silos are to be hardened and which particular silos have the proper soil conditions and so forth.

What has been clearly decided, Mr. Chairman, is the importance—and the President has decided on the importance—of deploying the MX missiles as they come off the production line, as opposed to simply putting them into warehouses and waiting until the more permanent mode of deployment is determined. We already have underway the R. & D. processes to examine the various promising options that I mentioned last time. It is important to have them deployed with additional protection and to have the Soviets understand that we have a new, much more accurate hardened missile with more warheads and with an ability to destroy hardened targets, should the need arise.

The importance of the Soviets knowing that that missile is being deployed, ready to be used and integrated into the system, as it comes off the production line, rather than waiting in a warehouse, is, I think, a very important factor and one that has been clearly decided.

So, I think when we say that there are uncertainties and the plan is not ready and all that, we should bear in mind that the objectives and the goal of the plan are all decided and strongly recommended to the committee.

What we are talking about are the details of what we might call the blueprints for the individual silo hardening that is part of the plan.

So, we would not want there to be any misunderstanding or any doubt as to our conviction or our feeling that it is essential to do this, nor that this is indeed the President's program. It is, and he has recommended this strongly.

Since I was last with you, we have reviewed the projected acquisition costs of the B-1B bomber. We believe we can fully develop and procure 100 B-1B bombers at a total cost of $20.5 billion in fiscal 1981 dollars, including funds to equip the bombers with external and internal cruise missile carriage. The 19th B-1B off the line would be equipped for cruise missile carriage and the earlier aircraft would be modified to carry cruise missiles later in the 1980's.

When the fleet is acquired, they will have the cruise missile capability, which they should have.

To insure that it does not exceed the $20.5 billion budget, we have directed that the following steps be taken—I might say parenthetically here, Mr. Chairman and Senators, that this is not going to be limited to the B-1B program.

We have had a situation in the past in which a number of factors have contributed to cost overruns. The problem really, from my own point of view as I see it now, has been that there has been no cost to anyone to bring in a cost overrun. There has been no penalty associated with it. There has been nothing but an occasional hand-wringing and some anguished statement. It has been accepted and we have gone on and waited for the next cost overrun.

What we are trying to do is strangle that process at birth by having a situation in which it will be very apparent that there is a very high cost to bringing in anything in the nature of a cost overrun.

So, what we are going to try to do is initiate this system with the B-1B acquisition, but apply it to other long-range, large systems also, that starting with the actual contract negotiations. Without intending to be critical or cast any aspersions anywhere, I think that we have to improve the contracting process so that we have a situation in which there is a penalty for cost overruns. We are not going to have to wait 2½ years to get something that we needed 2½ years earlier and say that is a dreadful thing and walk away from it.

So, that is one of the things we are going to try to do with the contract process at the beginning.

The other thing—something that I know works extremely well in the private sector—is very close monitoring, of these things on a week-by-week basis including inquiry as to why a certain part is being delayed, and because that part is being delayed from a subcontractor, what is that doing to the completion date. That kind of very close monitoring, I know from experience, works in the private sector. Again I saw this without any desire whatever to be critical of anything that has happened in the past, we are going to try to institute this procedure from the beginning all the way through a program.

Also, with the B-1B we are going to freeze the design. Engineering change orders will be held to an absolute minimum. That is again one of the things that has caused a lot of problems in the past.

As I mentioned to you many times, Mr. Chairman, when I was at the OMB in 1970 and 1971, we put the money in for the B-1. I understand that it was canceled in 1977, but the simple fact is that it should have been procured in 1977, but was not because of a number of factors, including some changes in design.

We are going to freeze the design of the aircraft now and ride with it right until the time it comes on line.

We plan to proceed with a very vigorous multiyear contracting program to achieve the lowest possible procurement cost. The Secretary of the Air Force has been directed to submit, in 30 days, an overall management plan describing in detail the things that I have just mentioned as to how we can hold to the cost and schedule objectives of the B-1B program.

There will be quarterly reports made to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and by him to me, describing the progress achieved in carrying out the plan; but the quarterly reports will be based on virtually weekly reports of people at various levels examining this whole project.

No change in the acquisition plan for the B-1B or major changes in configuration can be made without the specific approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. DeLauer, our General Counsel will review the contract negotiating process on a continuing basis.

Once those negotiations begin, there will be biweekly reports on the progress submitted to Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci and to me.

The President believes we must deploy the B-1B as soon as possible. In discussion over the detail, the underlying rationality and necessity for this has been overlooked; that is, the ability of the B-52 to penetrate will be lost in the mid-decade. It now takes much too long for it to escape from its bases in the United States. The B-1B will give us a continuing penetrating capability into the 1990's until the advanced technology bomber [ATB] is ready, and it will also have a very substantial conventional capability thereafter.

[Additional information follows:]

A corrected assessment of B-1B capability to penetrate current and projected Soviet air defenses well into the 1990s was provided to the Congress on November 18, 1981 in a joint memorandum signed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. The memorandum is submitted here for the Record.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., November 10, 1981.

Hon. JOHN G. TOWER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The following joint statement is intended to clarify capabilities of the existing and planned U.S. bomber force to penetrate current and projected Soviet air defenses.

The intelligence community estimates that current Soviet air defenses would be unable to deal effectively with conventional bombers penetrating at low altitude because they lack sufficient deployed forces with the technological capabilities to detect, track, and engage such targets effectively. The Soviets have several programs underway that will substantially improve their capabilities to perform each of these key functions by the late 1980's. The impact of such improvements will depend on the pace of their air defense deployment programs and the progress they make in improving the technical capabilities of their radars, command and control systems, and weapons. Although the number of deployed units projected by the intelligence community for the late 1980's would not be sufficient to heavily defend all potential targets in the Soviet Union, the Soviets are likely to concentrate their better-quality defenses to protect the targets which they perceive to be most valuable.

Department of Defense analyses indicate that the B-1 will have better capabilities to penetrate Soviet air defenses during the next 10 years than other conventional type bombers.

As new low-altitude-capable air defense systems are deployed in sizable numbers in the last half of the 1980's, penetration of Soviet air defenses by aircraft such as the B-52 will become more difficult, particularly against those targets which the Soviets choose to defend heavily. This aircraft has a large radar cross section and relatively slow low-altitude penetration speed, neither of which can be appreciably changed.

The B-1 as originally designed, while having a radar signature smaller than the B-52, would nevertheless have been detectable by Soviet radars. However, continuing development and testing of radar signature reduction techniques has achieved a further tenfold reduction in radar signature relative to the original B-1 design. This reduced signature allows the B-1B to employ fundamentally new ECM techniques which cannot be applied to the B-52 due to its large radar cross section. As a result of the combination of reduced signature, higher penetration speed, and new ECM, Soviet defense engagement opportunities will be severely reduced. Jamming power levels necessary to mask the remaining signature are achievable.

Tests against advanced technology air defenses indicate a high degree of success with these techniques. DOD analyses based on the results of these tests indicate the B-1B would have the capability to penetrate anticipated Soviet air defenses well into the 1990's in a multitude of employment modes and to perform effectively as a cruise missile carrier and as a conventional bomber into the next century.

The planned Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) will serve as an essential element of a mixed force of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles capable of holding at risk the whole variety of targets necessary to deter the Soviet Union through the 1990's and well into the next century. The ATB will ensure continuing capability against the extremely important targets which the Soviets would defend most heavily with combinations of their newest air defenses and mobility or superhardening. A mixed force of B-1 cruise missile carriers and the ATB will present an extremely difficult problem to the most sophisticated defense system—thereby requiring major expenditures by the USSR on defensive systems that cannot be used to attack the US and its allies.

WILLIAM J. CASEY.
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER.

Secretary WEINBERGER. When you look at the cost of getting 100 of the B-1B's and the number of ATB's that we think are necessary, when you look out to the end of both programs, you will find there is very, very little difference in the costs of acquiring the B-1B now and the ATB later on, versus waiting for the ATB to become available, and having a single bomber program.

So, there is no question in my mind whatever that the President believes we need to deploy the B-1B as soon as possible. We fully agree with him. The Air Force agrees with him. I hope this committee will agree, too.

I don't want to talk any longer, Mr. Chairman. We will be glad to pause for questions.

I have been advised that General Jones has to leave at 11 a.m., so we might want to keep that in mind as the questions are framed.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to make this statement.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Do you desire that either General Jones or Dr. DeLauer make a statement, or can we proceed to questions?

General JONES. I have no statement.

Dr. DELAUER. I also have no statement.

Chairman TOWER. Two of our members were not able to get in their full 10 minutes of questions last time. Senator Levin has 5 minutes remaining. Senator Denton has his full 10.

I will first recognize Senator Levin for 5 minutes.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, you indicated the Strategic Subcommittee has been holding hearings. I have been present at the hearings day after day for the last few weeks. The conclusion I have reached from the testimony of the officials of DOD and others is that the strategic program is a shambles. The MX basing mode, hardened silos, do not solve the Minuteman vulnerability questions that many perceive; it is immobile; it simply makes bigger missiles more tempting targets.

Senator Nunn also showed yesterday that it probably contains technical violations of SALT.

DOD will apparently say anything to sell the B-1 bomber. A few months ago we were told that the B-1 could penetrate Russian radar for only a few years after their deployment in the mid-1980's.

Yesterday, we were told that it could penetrate Russian radar to the mid-nineties. Parenthetically, whichever date you take, you won't be able to penetrate for more than one-third of its useful life.

The cost of the B-1 has been understated for no other purpose but to help sell it. Within a week after its $19.7 billion pricetag was announced, the Air Force acknowledged that it was at least $1 billion more, and Lieutenant General Burke on October 29 said that the figure was $20.8 billion. The GAO has tentatively found it will cost billions more than that.

Mr. Secretary, I am informed that your own independent Cost Analysis Improvement Group, CAIG, just this last weekend told you it would cost $27 to $28 billion.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is incorrect and misleading. I don't know if you have finished your statement, but I want to get that in the record immediately so that there will be no suggestion that silence means consent.

Senator LEVIN. These are constant fiscal year 1981 dollars. You have also exaggerated the other positions to sell the B-1.

Just a few weeks ago you told us that the Stealth bomber, which many of us prefer as an alternative to the B-1, would be ready in 1989. The Department of Defense changed that to the early 1990's, with the obvious effect of trying to strengthen your B-1 argument.

In order to sell the B-1, you have even tried to rewrite the dictionary. You have advertised that the IOC, the initial operating capability, of the B-1 would be 1986, but the Air Force has told us that is the date when 15 bombers will be delivered to SAC. The mandatory DOD definition of "IOC" is the first attainment of the capability to employ effectively a weapon.

The GAO obtained from the Air Force Strategic Systems Program Office the admission that the first squadron of B–1's would not be ready to stand nuclear alert, which is their mission, until 1987.

By the admission of every administration spokesman, we have heard your strategic program is offered only as an interim solution to what you believe is a serious window of vulnerability, but to achieve this interim solution, a solution which begins 5 years from now and arguably provides additional protection for us for a grand total of another 5 years or so, we are being asked to pay a terrible price. It is not only a price in terms of dollars but a price also in terms of security.

Yesterday, General Davis, who is the head of SAC, admitted that the net effect of adopting this program would be to weaken the strategic defense of the United States for the next 5 years. This is because of the earlier than planned retirement of the B–52D and Titan missiles.

We will be worse off for the next 5 years than we are now.

I have never heard of closing a window by opening it wider. This is all from an administration which promised to hit the ground running and rearm America.

Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, you have created an impression that we are weak and now through your actions you are creating that reality. Not only is the strategic program a shambles and a waste, but also funds wasted are draining our real conventional forces' needs and our readiness needs.

The administration proposed $2 billion in cuts within the past few weeks, and that they be made in the privacy of a Senate-House conference, rather than following public hearings. Here are some of the cuts:

Pershing Gulf and Indian Ocean naval presence, a 25-percent reduction. The other cuts, including the size of the Army below the Carter figure, early retirement of nine ships, cuts in Navy fleet modernization, will have to be identified this afternoon or tomorrow when on the Senate floor a number of us intend to raise these questions about the conference report for the 1982 authorization.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Is there any opportunity to respond to that, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman **Tower**. You may respond to that if you choose to, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would like very much to respond to it, because it contains a great many incorrect, inaccurate, misleading, and highly dangerous and, I think, deceptive utterances that will cause us harm, because they will give comfort to people who are trying to create the impression that this administration and this country are still the kind of weak and vascillating country that it was during the previous administration. This impression has caused so much trouble with our foreign policy and with our ability to convince the world and our potential adversaries that America is arming, is gaining a great deal of strength, and is determined to be a reliable ally and not the kind of vascillating, weak presence that we were for the previous 4 years.

What I would particularly like to have understood is that this question that some have referred to as interim solutions in a sneering fashion is totally misleading.

The Senator talks as if it is possible to bring on a new, strengthened strategic system in something under 3 months and that our willful failure to do so indicates a desire to remain weak.

The problem here is that these solutions take a very long time to bring on, no matter what they are. It is essential that that be understood and that we start now with these systems.

It is the fact that we did not start with any of these things years ago that leaves us in the kind of position we are in now, where we have to do a lot of things and do them as quickly as possible so as to regain as much strength as we can as soon as possible.

The Senator has talked about how the window of vulnerability will be opened more widely during the next few years because, while we are bringing on the MX missile which we will get operational as soon as we can and could have had 5 years earlier if it had been ordered 5 years earlier, we have to prepare to deploy it.

The other answer is to leave it in the warehouse. If we took any of the other solutions that have been proposed, it would not likely be ready until after 1986. This way, we will get it operational in late 1985 to 1986 in some quantities and that, I submit, is better than doing nothing but wringing our hands and saying that we are weak and all we are proposing are interim solutions.

After 1985 and 1986 we hope to have a more long-range solution for deployment. In the meantime, it will be deployed, it can be used, and it will add substantially to the strategic deterrent.

The same is true of the B-1B. We can wait until the early 1990's whenever the new plan will be ready—we don't know when that will be—and we can talk about that in more detail in a closed hearing. Are we to do nothing in the meantime but wring our hands and say, therefore, what we are talking about is an interim solution and therefore we should do nothing? Because that is something that I think our opponents would be delighted to hear.

To criticize it on the basis that it is not going to be operational within 2 weeks not only displays a substantial ignorance but an ignorance to a degree that I think can only be designed to be misleading and to pick up things for criticism solely for the basis of criticizing.

Now, we have had no question whatever about the need for strategic improvement. All these criticisms are always cloaked in language that indicates how vital it is that we do something and do something immediately. When interim solutions are proposed while you are in the process of developing and acquiring a better solution, then the criticism is made that they are only interim solutions. It is a little like some of the examples that people give on how to solve the energy problem. You can't use oil because it is too expensive. You can't use nuclear power because it is too dangerous. You can't use coal because it is too dirty.

What do you do? You leave the country without sufficient energy. That is one of the analogies that I think can be drawn from this kind of criticism.

So, I appreciate very much the opportunity to respond in general terms to this general criticism. I will be glad to try to take questions.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. Mr. Secretary, I realize that we are in an early stage of looking at a new proposal. My remarks and thoughts are posed on that, so I will be general, as was Senator Levin, and expect you to be general in your replies, because we are just looking at a relatively new and sharp turn in planning in an area which involves our survival.

Frankly, had I been permitted to question you the last time, instead of losing out, with Mr. Levin, I think I would have been more emotional than thoughtful, because I was candidly quite shocked by the shift in direction.

I am glad that time has intervened and that I have had time to compose myself, but I am still very unsettled and I admit that I am not totally informed by any means, and I wish to outline to you some of my concerns and ask you to address yourself to them.

Our President was elected partly on the platform of his emphasis on the window of vulnerability and the fact of his willingness to increase defense expenditures as a survival matter, and yet the shock derives from these developments, and I may be wrong in the details, but as I understand President Carter's program developed under Secretary of Defense Brown, we had something like 200 MX's in 4,600 silos as that portion of the Triad, and an estimate of $40 billion going up to $100 billion on a sliding scale as we added more silos and perhaps more missiles as the Soviets developed more missile capability against that.

So, we had some kind of idea of what that cost was, some kind of general agreement that that plan would work.

Then President Reagan comes in with his MPS system in which we no longer move the missiles but we decrease the number from 200 to 100 and decrease the number of silos from 4,600 to 1,000, which does not give the impression to me, having eliminated the mobility and have the missiles in silos, of some improvement in defense capability in that particular arm of the Triad.

We have the President one day coming out saying he is going to challenge the Soviets to an arms race if they are not reasonable about their approach to arms limitations, and within the next week or two people from OMB saying that we are going to have to cut defense, you can't exempt defense from the areas which are going to undergo cuts.

As I understand it now, the new plan is to produce 100 missiles. I applaud the idea to go ahead and produce 100 missiles rather than continue to argue about that.

As I understand it, you are going to put roughly half of those missiles in hardened Titan II silos. I don't know precisely what you are going to do with the other half. I presume you are going to wait for a final basing determination, which again is not something that I question. I believe it is possible we could come up with a better plan than the one we have.

You also are going ahead with the Trident II missile plan which will give the submarines a bigger area in which to work and therefore they will be a more reliable arm of the Triad, and perhaps introduce a question regarding the emphasis, the proportion, which will be placed on that arm of the Triad.

I understand you are going to produce 100 B-1's to replace aging B-52's, do some R. & D. on the Stealth with production in the 1990's.

What this looks to me to be is an apparent stepdown in the willingness to meet the costs of survival. That is the shock which I derive from these things. It looks as if—although there is validity in the nature of some of your delays and decisions—the overall nagging specter is one of are we willing to meet the costs, what are the costs, and are we willing to meet them?

The reason that question arises, as I see it, the antinuclear thing in Western Europe, you talk in encouraging terms about NATO, I see a third of our youth required to register for possible selective service. I hear at every meeting I go to new remarks about our having to balance the budget, we have to cut defense as well as other things, and we can't exempt military retired pay, we can't exempt veterans' benefits.

I hear more and more talk about the need for RDF and less of action about where we are going to get it and how much it is going to cost.

That is the general kind of concern I have.

I would quote from an article I wrote on this subject some months ago. I think this is the basic question. I will never forget General Dixon when he was talking about things way back in the mid-1970's, how bad they were tactically and strategically. He would say, "Why is this imbalance permitted to exist at the risk of our very survival?" Then he would flash a slide on the screen and show a Russian town of 25,000 population, mud streets, no automobiles, no television, and he would say, "That is why."

Are we willing to trade for survival that which would be nice, that which is compassionate to a degree? In 1960 the percentage of total outlay for defense by this country was roughly 50 percent, for social services 27 percent. By 1980 these figures are reversed, 25 percent for defense, 52 percent for social services. If it is true we have a window of vulnerability, why does this continue to happen?

I agree—and I just put through the Senate the other day the first bill I have managed, the older Americans Act, in which we did not cut down on the services available to the aged, and God knows they are a worthy as well as deserving part of our population. I did not get one word in the Washington Post about that. I am only talking about in terms of terrorism and defense, but I do care about older people and the poor.

The fact is that it is true, we must judge a wealthy nation by how well it cares for its poor and disadvantaged. A nation spending itself in bankruptcy has no capacity to take care of its poor. A government that cannot make its people secure has betrayed all its citizens. A nation that loses its way to protect itself loses its way of life.

It seems to me we may be evading the hard question of how much does it cost to survive.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Those are very valid concerns. I don't think we are evading them. We are proposing to improve, increase, strengthen, and operate the strategic program by spending $180 billion in the next 6 years. That will be less than 14 percent of the total that we propose to spend on defense, the balance being for strengthening and modernization of the conventional forces and some of the other personnel and payroll costs to which you referred.

I don't think there is any slight suggestion here that we are skimping on defense. Most of the suggestions, not from you but from many others, have come from the points you comment on; that is, that people are talking about the necessity to cut defense for fiscal reasons, such as the chairman referred to at the beginning. We have already taken the cuts that the President has concluded could safely be made, but no more can be made. That is the position he has taken.

I hope that your colleagues do not go below those cuts that have been made. I do not believe we are taking any risks with our security. I cannot believe there is any higher priority than the safety and ability of the United States to continue to survive, and our program has been constructed accordingly.

We are a large Nation of enormous basic strength and we are a Nation whose basic values are fully compatible with other democratic states. As you know from the study of history, it has been hard to persuade democratic states over the centuries that it is essential to make sacrifices and substantial investment in the preservation of their freedom and their security, particularly in time to do so.

In the past we have always had time enough, even though we may have come to a decision very late as we did in World War II. We may not have time enough again. That is the point we keep emphasizing again and again.

I have said we will never know that we are doing these things in time until it is too late. It is essential that we do all these things now, so that we do not reach that point that you have correctly identified, a point where it becomes obvious we have no course left but to accept the consequences of nuclear blackmail, either that or fight in a war that we can't possibly win because we had not prepared ourselves for it.

We believe that the plans we have presented to the Congress, the plans that we are discussing this morning, will enable us to preserve the security of the United States against a very substantial adversary, an adversary that is not in the least worried about the economic conditions or the personal living qualities of its citizens and one that invests enormous sums of its meager economy in defense matters.

It is essential that we recognize the nature of that threat and that we start just as early as we can to meet it.

I am already worried that we are very late, particularly in view of the length of time that it takes to bring these systems on board. Even a simple hand weapon takes far too long, in my opinion, partly because our productivity is down and partly because we seem to have grown out of the habit of being able to do things quickly and decisively.

If I get somewhat impatient with people who criticize what are called interim solutions, it is because of my concern that they don't appreciate the importance of doing everything we can right now.

Part of the program that the President has asked for is over 3,000 cruise missiles. Some people say they are not adequate or that is not the way to go for a final solution. What it is, however, Senator, is the ability to get something on line in 1984, as opposed to 1988 and 1989 and 1990. These are vital things to do.

So, I don't dispute in any way your concerns or the worries that you have expressed. I do suggest, respectfully, that what we have proposed is a program that will meet those concerns and is within our capacity and our capability, and does place correctly the highest emphasis on our survival, our security, and our preservation of liberty.

Senator **DENTON**. My time is up. When I do have another chance to ask questions, I will refer to such shocking matters to me as the sudden emergency of the advocacy of hardening MX silos without sufficient, in my view, military expert justification for that, and it does save money not to have all those silos and missiles and just say you harden. That is the kind of thing I think requires looking into further.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. We will submit detailed answers about that and I will be delighted to try to cover them.

Chairman Tower. Mr. Secretary, administration witnesses continue to cite the Townes panel report in discussing the MX decision. The committee has not been allowed to see the Townes panel report. Key military officers such as Gen. James P. McCarthy, Air Force Special Assistant for MX, has not seen the report. Air Force Chief for R. & D. General Burke, did not see the report until the day of the President's decision. Mr. Henry Rowen, a member of the Townes panel testified before the Strategic Subcommittee as the newly appointed Chief of the National Intelligence Council, but did not wish to address the Townes panel report at that time.

My question is, Mr. Secretary, are we going to receive the Townes panel report, or are we going to continue to have it interpreted for us?

Secretary Weinberger. I think you will see it, Mr. Chairman. The problem is that it was a report prepared for the President by an uncompensated commission that he and I constituted to give us some advice and assistance in the development of the program. They did that. Some of their suggestions were followed and some were not. But the problem in presenting it to the committee is a simple technical one of getting the necessary permission from the people who participated on the assurance that they were giving some advice to the President of the United States. We want to make sure that it is fully understood that they do agree, since they were asked to work on the basis I noted, to a somewhat broader distribution of their work.

I think that it would be incorrect to attach an undue importance to the coincidence of any of the recommendations in the President's program with all of the recommendations in that report. It was a very valuable, useful, and extremely important contribution. It was made directly to the President at his request. If the necessary permission can be secured, and I hope it can, it will be distributed to you. It is not for any desire that you not see it that I have not transmitted it earlier. It is because these people were asked to work on a special basis with that commitment being made.

I want to be sure that they understand that that would be changed by the distribution or the release of the report to the committee, but we will make every effort to get that and to get it to you.

Again, I say that it was a report which was helpful in considering a lot of these matters. It was not necessarily decisive on any one matter.

Chairman Tower. You understand, Mr. Secretary, it is difficult for us to accept the Townes panel as an authority or as a source. It has been quoted to us here and we don't know what they did or what is in the report. It reminds me of the fact that the journalistic community often cites reliable sources but never tells us who they are. So we don't know what degree of reliability to place on what they report.

This is not a slap at the journalistic community, I might say to the table over here on the left; however, it could be interpreted that way.

Secretary Weinberger. Right.

Chairman Tower. Mr. Secretary, the administration has said that its strategic program is an improvement over the previous effort and will permit us to negotiate from strength and will enable us to close the window of vulnerability. We have, however, no detailed analysis from the administration which proves those points. For example, this committee asked the following question:

In terms of static measures such as weapons delivery vehicles, megatonnage, equivalent megatonnage, etc., how do the Reagan and Carter plans compare?

The answer that was given is as follows:

> As a matter of policy, this administration has decided that static, strategic force indicators should not dictate programmatic decisions, force effectiveness being a more meaningful measure.

I must say that I am a little bit unclear as to the meaning of the response and I must regard it as an inadequate answer to the question. In my view we need to get the basic force data so that we can examine the assumptions behind the dynamic analysis that you present. This is vital because the testimony we have received from the Commander of the Strategic Air Command does not appear to support any assertion that the Reagan program is clearly militarily superior to the Carter program.

My question is: Can you supply for the record as soon as possible a year-by-year comparison of the Reagan and Carter force structure with the static measures that we have discussed?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will try to do that, Mr. Chairman. We will also couple it with the statement you read that these may not be as effective indicators of relative strength, of our growing ability to deter attack, but we will supply it in any form that you wish just as soon as we can.

[The information follows:]

> We do not believe that static measures, which show only pre-attack peacetime inventories rather than surviving wartime capabilities, are meaningful indicators of overall strategic capabilities. These measures, therefore, did not influence decisions on the Reagan strategic program, although the Reagan program compares favorably to the Carter program in static indices. By 1990, for example, the Reagan program increases the number of on-line launchers by 18 percent, on-line warheads by 11 percent, on-line equivalent megatonnage by 12 percent, and on-line hard target kill capability by 12 percent.
>
> For measures of force effectiveness after a Soviet first strike, our survivable capabilities will increase significantly with the Reagan program. When compared with the previous program under conditions of fully generated alert, the Reagan program increases the number of surviving warheads in 1990 by about 10 percent, and increases surviving equivalent megatonnage and hard target kill potential by about 25 percent. Somewhat smaller increases result from a comparison of the two programs following a Soviet first strike when both sides are in a peacetime alert posture.
>
> Our current simulations of nuclear conflict do not capture some important factors that would bear strongly on the actual effectiveness of our forces in war. For example the post-strike results above do not include assessments of the ability of national command authorities to communicate with and control surviving forces. When such factors are included, the Reagan force compares even more favorably to the previous program because of the increased emphasis being given to communications and control and to the ability of surviving forces to endure for longer periods in wartime.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, because of the confusion about the cost estimates of the official B-1B program, could you personally take charge and send over a definitive statement which addresses funding of the B-1B, including implied costs of the B-1 not normally expressed as a part of the B-1 acquisition cost?

Now, I am somewhat reassured by your statement that you intend to freeze the design for the B-1 and that no major change will be permitted without specific authorization of the Secretary of Defense. I might add when you say that, does that impact in any way on the fact that once the B-1's useful life as a penetrator has ended that there will be any problem with the convertability to ALCM, or can that transition be made relatively cost effective?

Secretary Weinberger. Actually they will be ALCM carriers.

Chairman Tower. In other words, both features will be built into the aircraft?

Secretary Weinberger. Yes. With respect to the cost, we do have a definitive statement. The statement has been made earlier that we have been advised by our independent audit group that our estimates are wrong. That is incorrect, as were so many of the other statements made earlier. What has been advised is that if you include various additions which may or may not be necessary, the costs will rise. This is not surprising since anything you add adds cost. But the basic question is what is needed for the plane, and what in our opinion is needed for the plane comes out at $20.5 billion.

I am not saying it is inexpensive or it is a stripped down model or anything of the kind. It is a very expensive, very good airplane which will have a very long life in many different capacities and missions. That is the cost that we are going to make every effort to hold to. We examined all of the things that the other audit groups have told us are going to run the costs up and we have concluded either that they are not needed or that they are funded by other programs within the departmental budgets which were not examined by the other agencies.

We will get that statement to you that you asked for.

Chairman Tower. I would appreciate that.

[The information follows:]

B-1B Costs

DOD cost estimate for the B-1B in fiscal year 1981 dollars

	Billions
100 aircraft:	
R.D.T. & E	$2.4
Procurement	16.2
Spares	1.1
Cruise missile carriage	.8
Total	20.5

At approved DOD/OMB inflation rates this equates to $27.7B in then year dollars. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has added a potential $5.7B (fiscal year 1981 dollars) to this estimate. This $5.7B plus a difference in average inflation rates (CBO—1.58 vice DOD/OMB—1.35) equates for the cost difference of $39.8B versus the DOD estimate of $27.7B in then year dollars.

The specific items which were added by the CBO, based upon a draft GAO report, and the DOD evaluation is as follows:

Item	Cost (fiscal year 1981)	Evaluation
Rear bay enlargement	173	Not required.
PAL/CD	187	In estimate.
ALCM carriage	640	Do.
ALCM avionics	26	Do.
Engineering change order budget	400	Estimate adequate.
Change in avionics learning curve	100	Do.
Change in airframe learning curve	500	Do.
Reduction in avionics production estimate	86	Do.
Consideration for multiyear procurement	800	Estimate acceptable in budget.[1]
Transfer of engine component engineering development to component improvement account.	40	
Deferral of air vehicle depot support development	300	Estimate adequate.
Operational test and evaluation	(2)	In estimate.
Engine component improvement program	115	In budget.[1]
Conventional weapons certification	(2)	In estimate.
Interim contractor support	500-2,000	In budget.[1]
Production facilities improvement	71	Do.[1]
Manufacturing technology enhancement	170	Do.[1]
Base facility improvement	173	Unknown.
Nuclear weapons certification	500–750	In estimate.
Second inertial navigation system	220	Not required.
Forward looking infrared sensor	125	Do.
Simulator development and procurement	337	In budget.[1]
Full scale fuselage fatigue testing	140	Not required.
Fuel tank inerting system	(2)	Do.
Electro-magnetic pulse testing	(2)	In estimate.
Low frequency/very low frequency communications	(2)	Do.
Hardware, testing, electronics and support	(2)	O. & S. cost.
Future improvements to avionics	(2)	Unknown requirement.

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[1] There is $370,000,000 properly budgeted in other accounts for engine component improvements, manufacturing technology and facilities improvement. These items, while caused by the B-1B program are applicable to other programs such as engine component improvement. The B-1B engine core is used on the KC-135 reengining, fighter improvement engine and classified programs; therefore, it is properly a common charge.

The other two items, simulators and interim contractor support are oriented toward operations and support and are funded in the appropriate accounts.

Detailed rationale for the acceptance or nonacceptance of each of the listed items is available and will be furnished in the Department's reply to the GAO report.

[2] No estimate.

Chairman Tower. Mr. Secretary, I must say that I do not concur with all of the assertions made by Senator Levin in terms of the way we tried to accommodate the $2 billion reduction recommendation. In fact, once the cat is out of the bag we are going to be hard pressed to prevent reductions by the Congress from exceeding those reductions which the President recommended.

I think we have done the right thing to try to absorb those in the conference committee since all the conferees had notice of this some days ago and questions were raised in consideration of the two bills by the conferees.

Let me ask you these questions. You can answer them quickly because my time is about up.

What guidelines or priorities were set by OSD for budget reduction?

Secretary Weinberger. Reductions that the President suggested this time?

Chairman Tower. Yes.

Secretary Weinberger. The guidelines were to each of the services to reexamine all of their programs and report those that had somewhat lower priorities than others and ways in which the total reductions requested by the President could be achieved with the least damage to the total overall set of objectives.

We then examined those recommendations and selected some of them as means of reducing the total program. I think it is entirely fair to tell you that none of the recommendations from the services for reduction were based upon a lack of necessity for the particular items.

It was simply that, viewed in the overall spectrum of things, they were somewhat lower priority in achieving readiness and sustainability and the necessary growth. Where growth could be sacrificed or postponed it was so that we could keep readiness, sustainability, and modernization as the priority items.

Exempted from that in one sense was the strategic program which was then in the final stages of development. The strategic program as finally approved by the President represents a program that will fit within the 6-year projected part of the Defense Department program and a preliminary, very preliminary, budget figure and the reductions have been made in the areas that I have described.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, what position does the JCS take on force reduction?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They were part of the process.

Chairman TOWER. In other words, they said they would rather have some force reduction than impact adversely on modernization?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I think that is a completely fair description of the feelings they expressed.

Chairman TOWER. Which reductions are likely to have an impact on near term readiness?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I suppose the air defense capability for the infantry units, the Roland, and not really a reduction but changes in the forward deployment of some of the naval units in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, and some delays in acquisition of some of the items necessary for modernization. These are the things you do when you have to make reductions in a previous plan. We like to think we have a well-coordinated, well-worked-out program for a number of years.

Some of the things we did, as you said correctly, were not based on military considerations, they were based on fiscal considerations. That is entirely understandable because we live in a system in which a number of different programs have to be considered side by side and the overall economy of the Nation is very vital.

So we didn't say that these should not be made. I would be wrong to tell you that they were easy to make or that they were programs that we didn't feel we needed. They were of somewhat lower priority than the others.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you.

Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, I am going to be quite brief without going over a lot of the reasons for the change. When you were here before, you did not have an estimate on the cost of putting the MX missiles in the existing silos and that is a matter that is so relevant in the Appropriations Committee of which I have the privilege of being a member.

Do you have a figure on that now?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir, we do.

Senator STENNIS. I understand from the chairman that that was covered before I came in. I thank you very much for giving the figures.

Now, since the President has announced his program in Western Europe on these nuclear weapons I have been really impressed with the waves of protest there and am concerned about it. If you care to discuss this at all in an open hearing, are these new programs satisfactory to you, and has that unrest subsided?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think it is fair to say the unrest has subsided. I am perfectly willing and indeed glad to have the opportunity to discuss it with you. I think we cannot disregard those demonstrations. They are large, they include extremist groups, but I think they are basically people who don't want to fight in a war, who don't want to have a war, and who don't want to have a nuclear war. These are understandable aims and objectives shared by everybody in the world.

I believe they think it is possible to achieve their objectives by nonarming, by making clear to the Soviets we will not put out any counter to the 250 SS-20 missiles that are already there and growing at the rate of one a week as the Soviets deploy more and more. I think they are people who feel any discussion of arms or plans to deter a war with increased strength is basically wrong.

I also think they represent a substantial minority. They have not affected any of the governments of Europe. The NATO Defense Ministers were very strong in their support of both the President's strategic program and in reaffirming the December 1979 NATO resolution which calls for both negotiations for reduction of theater forces and deployment of a counter to the SS-20's. They reaffirmed that in the sense of saying that the conditions that gave rise to it in December 1979 had not improved but had worsened and had underlined the necessity for going ahead with both tracks of that resolution.

I would answer by saying, I think the demonstrators represent a minority who feel that the best way to achieve peace is to do nothing about reaffirming or strengthening or providing any sort of counter. The governments, I think, share our view that the surest road to peace is to be strong enough to deter attack.

Senator STENNIS. That is very fine. It is a delicate matter. Maybe that will enable you to plan a little better before you make these announcements because the people are concerned and I am concerned about these weapons. I know you are.

I have a question for General Jones and I will wait until he returns, if I may reserve my time on that.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Stennis, General Jones was called away on extremely important matters. He may not return. We might submit that question for the record.

Senator STENNIS. I will submit it for the record. It relates to his opinion that he is convinced that this proposed basing mode will solve our problem. I will be glad to submit it.

[The question follows:]

Senator STENNIS. General Jones, when you testified the first time before this committee on these strategic programs, you were "not convinced" that the President's proposed MX basing mode would solve the problem of survivability of our land-based forces. Have you been convinced to the contrary in the last month? If so, why? If not, why not?

General JONES. Despite some continuing concerns about a proposed basing mode for the MX, particularly the superhardening, I support the MX program. No construction funds are requested in the FY 1982 budget; therefore, we have considerable time to refine the various aspects of deployment before we expend substantial resources on a specific basing arrangement.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, just a quick preliminary question which is not directly germane to the hearing today but nevertheless it falls within my area of jurisdiction as chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces.

The statement made yesterday by Secretary Haig with reference to the firing of a nuclear warning shot has caused a great deal of concern and I am hopeful this morning you can allay some of that concern. My recollection in having looked over those plans for a good 10 or 12 years is that that might have been a fragment of a very early plan but it is not one that is currently considered by our NATO allies.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is exactly correct, Senator. This was a suggestion, as I understand it, in the 1960's of some one of the military planners and it was reported as a suggestion. Indeed, Secretary Haig reported it as a suggestion that had been made at that time. There is absolutely nothing in any of the plans with which I am familiar that contains anything remotely resembling this, nor should it.

Senator WARNER. I appreciate that very much because we have to continue to emphasize the importance of modernization of theater nuclear forces. That requires the building of public confidence on both this side of the ocean and on the other side.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I might say that one of the highest priorities the defense ministers agreed on was some kind of education program for the public on both sides of the Atlantic as to the nature of the Soviet threat, the growing extent of it, and the need for people to understand what we are recommending and why we are recommending it.

So, I agree with Senator Stennis and you completely.

Senator WARNER. Let me take a line out of your statement about the education program and come directly to this central issue before the Senate and, indeed, the whole Congress, about the choice between the ATB, the B-1 or the mix.

Now, Senator Tower and I have presided over hearings now for 50 or 60 hours. It seems to me that there are now options and I would like to give you those options in the order that I feel the Senate is likely to consider them. The question I will put to you after stating the options is how would you rank them in priority? Would you agree with my priority? If not, give your reasons. I impress upon you the importance of the answer because it may well be, unfortunately, that the decision on the B-1 and the ATB will be conducted in the wee hours of the morning as we did last year in connection with the continuing resolution and so forth.

As I summarized the testimony and listened to it, the options are as follows:

First, the Congress funds a B-1 only.

Second, go to a rapid program of the ATB only.

Third, the B-1 with a decelerated funding profile for the ATB.

And fourth is what I view the administration's option now, B-1 plus an ATB at a funding level constrained only by the need to meet R. & D. goals and check points rather than budgetary constraints.

Now, given those four options, if you were compelled to make a decision, as we will be as Senators, have I ordered those in the proper priority?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir. I would start with four as the highest.

Senator WARNER. I understand that. I want the reality of dollars, Mr. Secretary. What would be your second?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have to say it is my only priority. Let me explain, Senator. I don't want to be cryptic or try to fool with words here. If you fund the B-1B only you are not going to be able to maintain a penetrating bomber capability which we think is vital. If you have a rapid funding of the ATB, which I will have to take up in detail in closed hearings, I am not at all sure you will get what you imply by that kind of option. If you do number three and fund the B-1B with declerated funding for the ATB, you will slow down the acquisition of an extremely good airplane that can give us a long lead quite early. If you do number four you have the best of all worlds.

Senator WARNER. The witnesses that have come before the subcommittee to date have indicated that they would have to emphasize spending for the B-1; if in fact it is the judgment of the Congress, and particularly the Senate, that you have to cut out some funding in this area, then it should not be taken from the B-1; rather, the ATB program would have to accept the impact of any cuts.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I strongly disagree with that.

Senator WARNER. Would you reverse it, then?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is one other element in here in addition to all that. If you want a cruise missile standoff capability you would then have to keep the B-52's alive a lot longer. That is an expensive process and not a very good one because it takes them so long to get off the ground and escape from their own bases. We have examined all these various possibilities.

If you do the B-1B only, you spend a lot of money—again I am trying to guess at the extent of development of the Soviet air defenses so if I use a couple years, give me leeway—and by sometime in the 1990's you lose the ability to penetrate with high confidence.

[Additional information follows:]

See corrected assessment of B-1B penetration capability submitted for the record on pages 44-45.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The other thing is that you do not have any followup, you do not have anything on the line. If you decide, as I am sure you would, in 1990 that you had to have something better you would then be 10 years away from getting it.

What you need then, I think, really, is to do the kind of track that we have talked about, which is to acquire the B-1B not as just an interim thing, but as a plane which for a number of years can penetrate and do a great deal of good, and thereafter for many years, well into the next century, can serve in a conventional capacity.

Senator WARNER. I have been through all that. I just want to bring another point to your attention. That is, historically in the Senate when we have reached a decision point involving highly classified material the Senate has relied on the judgment of a half dozen or more Senators who are familiar by way of background and having access to all the material. I don't know if that will be possible in the scenarios of the B-1B versus the ATB. I would be hopeful you could prepare a fact sheet that could be used by all 100 Senators to give them at least a threshold base of knowledge of the ATB so that they can individually participate in this, what I predict will be a serious, lengthy debate.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The logic is compelling and we will be glad to do it.

[The information follows:]

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BOMBER (ATB)

FACT SHEET

Next generation manned aircraft: Low observables technology; able to penetrate defenses into next century.

Contractors: Competitive source selection; Northrup, Boeing, Vought selected for research and development.

Schedule: Advanced bomber studies initiated to define configuration requirements and achievable performance; current pace of program will put the IOC into the early 1990's; and now in early initial research and development.

Capability: Flexible design with multi-role capability; capable of delivering nuclear weapons, cruise missiles or conventional weapons; long range and large payload; and air refuelable and advanced sensors.

Risks: Requires research and development; concepts proven, but specific application requires demonstration.

Senator WARNER. The President has stressed continuously that his hoped-for arms control reductions will be predicated on a position of strength.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. As we compare President Reagan's program with President Carter's, I would hope there is no departure from that theory, that you can still make a case that we are proceeding from a buildup, a position of strength, toward arms control.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have no doubt about that at all. Let's take as a quick example President Carter's cancellation of the B-1 and the substitution of the cruise missile and nothing else. We want to have a B-1 improved version and advanced bomber. You cannot really say that that is not an enormous increase in the strength that was previously proposed.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply disappointed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs could not be here because, while I have great respect for the Secretary, as he knows, I think that this committee needs very definitely some information from not only the Secretary of Defense representing the President but also those in charge of our military services.

I am not satisfied, frankly, Mr. Chairman, with the fact that we are going to submit questions for the record. I would like to ask at this time if it would be proper to have called back the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Chairman TOWER. I think it would be, and we will. The departure of General Jones is a matter over which he had no control. I can't discuss it with you right here.

Senator EXON. Let's get back to him because I, at least for one on this comimttee, need his input.

Chairman TOWER. We will be on this road for the next 2 weeks, Senator.

Secretary WEINBERGER. He did advise the staff and others that he would have to leave at 11 but he will be back any time you want him, I am sure.

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, the perception being advanced by the administration is that you are recommending wisely as to our defense needs, which may be correct. Let's look at some of the specifics particularly with regard to your decision to literally turn upside-down the strategic deterrent planning backed just a few months ago by all our present military leaders, which of course was based on your decision to eliminate the MPS basing mode for the MX.

Now, I think until I am satisfied that that was a correct decision, and I emphasize that it may be the correct decision, I for one need the information of the Townes Panel to get that accomplished. I was going to ask the general, had he been here, whether or not he had seen the recommendation of the Townes Panel before you and the President made the decision on elimination of the MPS basing mode for the MX. Do you know what he thought?

Secretary WEINBERGER. My impression is that he did but I would prefer to have him answer that.

Senator EXON. Let's go to the penetrating chances for the B–1B in answer to some of the questions that were raised with regard to Senator Levin, that you did not have a chance to respond to. I am going to give you some of my time to do that.

In the first place, the last time you were here I believe it is correct to say you testified that the B–1B probably would not be an effective penetrator of the 1990's.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think that is generally correct. We are not sure of the exact years. I said a moment ago to Senator Warner that that would occur in the range of the 1990's.

Senator EXON. Yesterday in front of our committee in open session, Gen. Bennie Davis, the Commander in Chief at SAC, testified that it would be a penetrator until 1995. I only cite these grave differences and signals that we are receiving both from you and from our top military commanders as making our decision on which way to proceed that much more difficult.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It may be, Senator. We certainly regret that. It, however, demonstrates that we have not imposed any straitjacket on testimony in the Department, and that may be a positive thing. The simple fact is that the information I have, the Department has, on which the decision was based, was that we would no longer be assured that the B–1B could continue as a high-confidence penetrating bomber after approximately that year if the Soviet rate of development does continue at the rate we think it will.

If their radars do not solve problems that we think they can solve within that time, we may have more time. I don't know. I think there is no question whatever that we will not be able to use the B–1B as a high-confidence penetrator after the 1990's.

In any event, it is certainly accepted by everybody that we will have to have something better than the B–1B and that we have the ability to get something better starting now. Again, the real problem here has been, I think, the failure to appreciate, and I am not saying the committee, but just generally the failure to appreciate the length of time it takes to do anything and the importance of starting early and staying with the decision.

That is why I think we should complete the B–1B—as I said, it was started in 1970—and get that ready so that we can use it for those years. Thereafter, we know right now it will not be reliable for that purpose although it will have a much longer life for conventional purposes and as a cruise missile carrier. Therefore we should start right now on the planning and production and ultimate development of a new plane which can give us a very long lead well into the next century.

Senator EXON. I will say, Mr. Secretary, if I were convinced that the B–1B would not be a penetrator after 1990 then I fail to see how I could, in good conscience, vote to spend $20 to $30 billion for that particular airplane.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Could I comment on that very briefly, Senator? Because it will have a very long life and a much more active role, we think the much more likely scenario and use of the B–1B will be as a conventional plane because we think there will be much more likelihood, if there is any conflict at all, that it will be conventional in nature.

The B–1B with its ability to deliver cruise missiles and ability to do all kinds of conventional missions is an enormously useful plane. It is not being bought as a 5-year hedge to put on the shelf at the end of that time. It is a plane which will have a very long life, a number of missions and a number of diverse uses, probably far greater, and I can certainly say that we hope that, than a purely strategic bomber.

Senator EXON. I assume that the Stealth would be able to carry out most of those missions if it were operational?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It could. It would certainly not be the optimum or best use. It is like using the B–52 in Vietnam. It could be done but it was not a very efficient use of resources.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon, I think this is a matter that has to be taken up in closed session.

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, your statement that you did not have a muzzle on our military leaders could be interpreted, as you say, as positive or it could be interpreted that the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The right hand is very familiar with the left hand, Senator. I think it would be a serious degradation of the legislative process if I said, "You are only to go up to Capitol Hill if you will state the following, and here is your statement." I don't operate that way. I never have.

I am not in the least afraid of the fact that there are differing views within the Department and obviously differing views on the Hill. But I have complete confidence in the fact that the decisions we have made are the decisions which are necessary to be made and they represent the decisions of this administration. That, obviously, does not mean they have to be accepted, but certainly I have never had the slightest fear of people disagreeing with me. I find it happens so very often and I have to get used to it. We would want people in the Department to state their views. I have disagreed with some of the views they have stated, and have advised them, but I have never told them, and never will, that they can't tell you what they honestly think.

Senator EXON. I would like some time before the Secretary leaves to ask him why, with the threat that we supposedly face today, the administration is reducing the Indian Ocean Fleet, reducing the cruise missile program and reducing the force structure of the Army.

Chairman TOWER. Let's come back to that.

Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be very brief and make one suggestion, Mr. Secretary. In listening to you this morning, along with others on the President's proposal for the strategic program, it became readily apparent to me that the strategic programs help bring equity and negotiating balance to the arms control negotiations, and if we are going to negotiate from strength that is the way it ought to be. Meanwhile, nonpeaceful disputes around the world will be conventional. So I really believe that we need to have a better perspective, a total picture, and I don't believe this has been adequately communicated to the American public or, frankly, to the committees in the Congress.

I think an elaboration and verbalization identifying and describing the total role in the conduct of foreign policy and in the interest of both our internal and external affairs of this country, the role that the strategic programs combined with conventional must and will play in the years to come. When that story has been told better than it has now I think you will find more support and less resistance to what you have presented, because I believe that is what your program has been put together on.

Secretary **Weinberger**. It has certainly been put together on the concept of our strategy and our overall foreign policy. I was of the impression it had been stated. I will be delighted to try to do it again. It is based simply and totally on the fact that we think the best way to maintain peace, which is the goal of the President, is to acquire sufficient strength to deter an attack upon us.

We do that by having sufficient strength so that the possible aggressor will know that if he makes a strike he will be faced with a retaliatory capacity to inflict a damage that he will find unacceptably high and therefore will be deterred from making the strike. We think we have to acquire that kind of strength strategically. We think we also have to acquire it conventionally. That is why this $180 billion strategic program is less than 14 percent of the total Defense expenditures we have proposed.

I think that puts it in proper perspective. Certainly there should not be any misunderstanding or doubt as to our policy. Our policy is to maintain security and peace with freedom. We think to do that is to regain the strength that will enable us to do that in complete confidence.

Senator **Jepsen**. We are playing catch up and it is a serious situation. Those of us who sat here in 1979 and listened to how strong we were at the end of the year, and after questions we came to parity and now window of vulnerability. Listening to the discussion of the B-1 bomber here this morning, you know, the B-1 bomber has a dual role in my opinion, and it has not been adequately described.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We have tried repeatedly to show that you are absolutely correct, Senator. It does have a dual role. It has a role as a conventional bomber of great versatility and strength, high payload capacity, low radar cross section, all of the things that are needed for a conventional bomber, and at the same time it has and will retain for a number of vital years the ability to penetrate. But it will not have the ability to penetrate after a certain number of years. So we have another one that we believe will. The B-1B is the one we are suggesting that we start off with at this time. That is why I had problems with Senator Warner's various options.

Senator **Jepsen**. It is very easy to get on the esoteric and strategic programs. It is like the Buck Rogers type of things. In the meantime there are brush fires and things that we are going to have to contend with such as the Soviets protracted conflict, which is not anything new, it has been protracted for a long time. We have to patch up and correct this image we have obtained about having a nonexistent RDF, an invisible airplane, and a hollow army, and those types of things.

Those are the things that eventually will tie in and expand simultaneously with the strategic program which I believe would be most helpful. It would be to me.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We are trying to flesh out the hollow army. The RDF does exist and is alive and well and growing. The invisible airplane is what we hope to deliver to you shortly.

Senator **Jepsen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Quayle?

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, my line of questions will focus on the manned penetrating bomber and the necessity of it. You say that in 1988–90 the B–1 will not be able to penetrate the Soviet Union. Is it not true that the last B–1B will roll off the line in about 1988?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think roughly around there.

Senator **Quayle**. If it is 1988 it could be that the last ones that roll off will be obsolete as far as penetration is concerned?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Obsolete is not the word. It cannot be used to penetrate with high confidence. It can, however, stand off and deliver cruise missiles and will have a very important conventional role.

Senator **Quayle**. As far as the manned penetrating bomber, that part will be obsolete; is that right?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We think it would not be safe to use it for that purpose.

Senator **Quayle**. Basically the primary role and function of the B–1B is not as a penetrating bomber?

Secretary **Weinberger**. It is for a period of years while we don't have anything else. That is the critical point. It is a penerating bomber for a period that may range from 4 to 5 to 6 years, during a period when we have nothing else that will pentrate. That is why it is essential to have it. If you take the assumption that we do and accept that, you need a penetrating bomber capability.

Senator **Quayle**. Beyond that period of time, whatever it is, 1988, 1989, or 1990, if the last one comes off in 1988, you will get the first one in 1986, you are really not going to have that penetration ability; you are going to rely on the cruise missile for the penetration.

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, Senator, not if the plans for the two planes proceed. Again, we will have to talk about the ATB in closed session, but generally speaking if the plans for the two planes proceed as we have recommended you will not have any period of time in which you will not be able to penetrate the Soviet air defenses. If you drop any of these you will have such a period. That is why it is essential——

Chairman **Tower**. Mr. Secretary and Senator Quayle, I think this is a matter that should be best pursued in closed session.

You don't really believe, Senator Quayle, that all your questions can be satisfactorily answered in open session?

Senator **Quayle**. Let me try to rephrase them so that they can be. We will be discussing this on the floor and we will be debating these issues.

Chairman **Tower**. We may have to go into closed session on the floor when we debate some of these issues. In any case, I would prefer if you would forbear and not get into these matters here.

Senator **Quayle**. What is the life expectancy of the B–1B?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well into the next century. If you had asked that question in 1950 about the B–52, you would have been told 10 to 12 years. The answer is that it will have a life as a conventional bomber well into the next century.

Senator **Quayle**. That is my point. We are really building a conventional bomber, aren't we?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, sir.

Senator **Quayle**. We are talking about the B–1B being the best conventional bomber.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We are building a dual purpose bomber. There are conceivably a very wide number of uses for it. But its immediate use, the thing that we need most is to avoid a period when we cannot penetrate the Soviet air space. The B–1B gives us that ability.

Senator **Quayle**. But we are talking about penetrating for a very short period of time, and the life expectancy of these planes is 30 or 40 years.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't care which label you attach to it. I do worry about giving up for any period of time an ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. If you want to label the B–1B largely conventional or experimental or a hedge or whatever, it does not bother me a bit. I think the label is comparatively unimportant.

Senator **Quayle**. Do you foresee some time the manned penetrating bomber, whether it is the B–1B or ATB, being basically replaced in our strategic analysis by the cruise missile? In other words, you are convinced that the ATB is always going to be able to penetrate their air defense?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We believe it will for a very long period of time. I can never give you a guarantee of ultimate permanence but I can tell you that we are agreed in the Department, civilian and military leadership, that a penetrating bomber capability is needed and that it would never be substituted for by a cruise missile capability. That was one of our principal objections, mine and others in the administration, to the cancellation of the B–1 when it was canceled. We think that was a fundamental mistake because it did attempt to rely on a cruise missile capability, which is not the same as or equivalent to or, indeed, as good in any way as the penetrating bomber capability.

Senator **Quayle**. You are telling me that a penetrating bomber as such, B–1B, ATB or whatever that follows on down the line, you really believe that there is no way that they are going to come up with an air defense capability to basically make a manned penetrating bomber obsolete or nonfunctional?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I have to confess to you I don't know what will happen in 2010 or 2030.

Senator **Quayle**. In the next 10 to 20 years?

Secretary **Weinberger**. As far as we know we will be able to penetrate during that period and, indeed, we have to be able to penetrate.

Senator **Quayle**. Let me switch gears with another question. There is a report that 300,000 people had not registered for the draft. What are we going to do about those people?

Secretary **Weinberger**. There has been no attempt thus far to initiate prosecution.

Senator **Quayle**. Will there be?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't know what the policy of the administration will be on that.

Senator **Quayle**. Will we have registration after the first of the year?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We have a law that will have to be examined prior to that time. I have not yet been able to give you administration policy on the matter. I do know there has to be respect for the law that is on the books. I have never heard the President take any position other than that. Indeed, in connection with the air traffic controllers he made that position very evident.

I have no doubt that he believes that laws on the books have to be enforced. There have not been enforcement efforts in the past because of the fact that we were getting a very high degree of compliance. As the situation may change the approach may change. I am not at this point able to give you administration policy on that.

Senator **Quayle**. You are not recommending prosecution of any of the 300,000?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, with your permission I never disclose recommendations to the President until he is ready to have them disclosed. It is a precedent I followed all the time I practiced law. It is covered by that kind of privilege.

Senator **Quayle**. Client-lawyer privilege. There are a lot of cases on that. This is a different situation. Do you think it is a viable option as far as manpower is concerned to not continue the registration after the first of the year?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We are getting the manpower we need. We are getting all the manpower that the Congress has authorized us to take on a voluntary basis. The quality is improving very substantially and dramatically. The retentions are improving very substantially and dramatically.

Senator **Quayle**. Does registration help that?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't know whether it does or not. I am trying to advise you of the fact as far as the manpower we are getting we are not able to take any more volunteers than we have now because we have no funding authority for them.

Senator **Quayle**. When will we be getting a decision whether we will continue registration after the first of the year?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't know.

Senator **Quayle**. Will it before the first of the year?

Secretary **Weinberger**. It is not my department. I will convey your concerns to those whose department it is.

Senator **Quayle**. You don't have anything to do with whether we are going to have registration?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I am interested in it but it is not within our department nor has a decision been made.

Senator **Quayle**. The manpower situation is certainly within your department.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, it is. That is what I was trying to explain, how satisfied we are with the current state of the volunteer program. It is delivering the numbers and the greatly improved quality that we need and the people who are coming into the system are staying in. We are very pleased with the existing manpower situation.

Chairman TOWER. May I suggest that the manpower question is a subject that the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee will get into in considerable depth. You will have ample opportunity later on.

Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Thank you. I thank you for including in the agenda today the issue of readiness raised in the resolution I introduced in the Senate on September 7.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you about that issue and start by quoting two statements from your own testimony before this hearing.

On January 29, 1981, in our posture hearing you said, "I have two highest priorities in rearming America. One is to improve the readiness of the forces in being. The other is to redress the imbalances that have developed between our strategic forces and those of the Soviets."

On March 4, 1981, in a hearing you said, "Our priorities are to remove known peacetime deficiencies first, and then to enhance the war fighting capabilities of our forces," and so forth.

The thrust of the resolution which I introduced and which the Chairman has included on our discussion agenda today cites in a "whereas" clause that we have failed to budget adequate amounts in past fiscal years for activities which most directly affect the state of combat readiness such as operations and maintenance, aircraft flying hours, fleet operating tempo, unit training time, spare parts, fuel, and ammunition.

That is by no means a comprehensive definition of what the phrase readiness means, but I would like to use it as a starting point and ask you to tell the committee the degree to which the proposed cuts which have been undertaken in the conference or are under discussion here today affect those categories of readiness in your own priorities.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The priorities have not changed, Senator. They were correctly stated then by me as my own priorities. They have not changed. I think what we have done since that time has been fully consistent with those priorities. The reductions that we recommended in response to the fiscal necessities, the $2 billion this year and $5 and $6 billion in subsequent years, go primarily to reducing force structure.

There are some things that are stretched out a little longer than we would like to stretch them out, but basically the priorities of increasing readiness, modernizing and strengthening what we have before we have increases in force structure have been adhered to. The reductions, as I mentioned before you came in, were reductions that were not proposed by the services but were things that have slightly lower priorities than some of the others in the original request.

Senator HART. Then, Mr. Secretary, in that regard let me ask whether, if readiness includes operations and if readiness includes aircraft flying hours, and if readiness includes fleet operating tempo and unit training time and ammunitions and fuel, how does the administration justify its reduction of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean from two carrier forces to one?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator Exon asked about that. What we are talking about, Senator, is the forward deployment of some of the various carrier groups that we have. If you change the forward deployment from two to one and a half or from four to three with a swing group participating in the Mediterranean part of the time and in the Indian Ocean part of the time, you haven't really reduced strength. You have reduced forward deployment and you have saved some funds, but not very much.

You do that primarily because it gives you greater flexibility for somewhat fewer dollars. It is not a reduction in strength; it means that you get that degree of strength in the particular area where you need it. It takes you perhaps a little longer.

If you had two in the Indian Ocean and two in the Mediterranean, you would still take some time to move them to the various areas of those oceans which are very large, vast oceans. It would take you some time to move to the particular areas where they are needed.

What is proposed is that we have three rather than four forward deployed. A fourth could be brought into the area within a few more days in addition to the time it would take to redeploy four if they remained there. I don't look on it as a reduction in strength.

Senator HART. Mr. Secretary, I did not use the word "strength." I am talking about readiness.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think it affects seriously the readiness because the fleets themselves are ready. The carrier groups themselves are ready even though they are not as forward deployed as they were before. It may take a little longer to get them in the desired position. Depending on where the action may be, that may be a very short time.

I do not think it is loss of strength or readiness; it is a change in forward deployment.

Senator HART. And reduction in presence?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Reduction in presence? I would not define it that way. It is a change in the ability to get presence within, in some cases, 2 days to 5 days. That is all we are really talking about. I don't think we have in any way impaired our war-fighting ability or our deterrent ability by the change.

Senator HART. How long does it take to get a nuclear aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea on station?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Depending on the compositon of the battle group, 4 days, 3 days, something in that range.

Chairman TOWER. The question is a nuclear carrier, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. On the nuclear carrier, we are involved in negotiations and discussions that may shorten that time. I would prefer to give you the details of it in closed session. There are some situations in which it would take somewhat longer, but we have carriers that are not nuclear powered that can transit within 3 to 4 days.

Senator HART. Mr. Secretary, how long does it take a nuclear aircraft carrier to go from the Mediterranean to Gunso station in the Arabian Sea?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Without going through the Panama Canal?

Senator HART. Yes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think it is in the neighborhood of 18 or 20 days, depending on where you want it to end up in the Indian Ocean.

Senator HART. The point is, Mr. Secretary, I must say it is somewhat disingenuous to reduce our presence in the Indian Ocean after all we have gone through in this administration and the previous administration on the criticality of that region to us, the arms sale of

$2.5 billion to the Saudis and all the arguments that have gone into those, and everything that has been said in this committee and the Halls of Congress and the White House under this and the previous administrations about how important this region is, and now to be reducing our presence in that region and saying it is really not a reduction in strength or a reduction in our ability to carry out our mission, I would say, with all due respect, is a disingenuous statement.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would disagree with you and take exception to that. I think it is a matter of forward deployment, and location, and depends on where the action is. These carriers that are not deployed forward in the Indian Ocean are not unavailable You know as well as I where their various homeports are. They do have the ability to get to the various places where action may be required within a period of time, which I don't think constitutes a reduction in our strength or a serious reduction in our readiness.

We have said many times that the reductions in the budget were not based on military considerations; they were based on fiscal considerations which have to play a part in the free democratic society we have, and that we all want to keep. I think it is not doing any particular service to the strength and ability to rearm the country to improperly characterize the shifts in forward deployment as constituting any weakening of our basic strength or of our determination to gain more strength.

We laid the keel just last week of a new nuclear carrier and we will continue to add to this strength.

Senator HART. I certainly hope the Saudi Government survives until that carrier gets to sea.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have no reason to suppose they won't.

Senator HART. Well, others do.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Others have been wrong from time to time. Others were very wrong in the previous administration in canceling some of the things that would give us the strength that we need right now.

Senator HART. The argument you made a minute ago, we heard a great deal from spokesmen of the previous administration about budgetary constraints.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Ours are not as serious as theirs were. When we talk about net rate of increase that follows even after the reductions the President has made in our requests, you have to look at the net, Senator. The net is very much larger.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I want to make one final comment.

I thank you for raising the issue. The correspondence which you circulated in bringing this matter to the attention of committees suggested that my motives here and intentions were to make readiness the highest priority. It was really the Secretary of Defense who made it the highest priority. My position was that if we are going to cut in defense, let us not cut here.

If the net effect of that is to make it the highest priority, so be it. It was really a baseline point beyond which we cannot go in cutting back on our defenses.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Regarding the question of whether we will pay the cost for survival or insuring survival, first we must know the cost, and referring to the chairman's statement, you did mention a cost figure. I have to get it straight in my own mind.

You mentioned $180 billion over the next some number of years for our strategic program. Is that 3 years or 6 years?

Secretary **Weinberger.** It is between 5 and 6 years. That is the total cost of the program. It covers the fiscal years 1982 through 1987, 6 fiscal years.

Again, I want to emphasize that that is less than 14 percent of the total defense expenditures requested.

Senator **Denton.** You cited about $6 billion to harden existing silos, but since you have deferred the main question on the principal basing mode solution, does that cost which you mentioned include the money required for whatever feasible basing mode which you might come up with?

Secretary **Weinberger.** The $5.6 billion to $7.8 billion is for silo basing only. However, the $180 billion total program does include a funding wedge for a more permanent basing solution.

Senator **Denton.** Including R. & D. cost but not production cost for such a choice?

Secretary **Weinberger.** It is designed to include the things that we will have to expand during that period of time, and during that period of time we will be well launched on the acquisition of the more permanent basing mode decided upon as a result of the R. & D. that is proceeding now.

The $180 billion does include those figures.

Now, I will say that the complete delivery of some of those elements may not be finished within the 6-year period, but we believe that the general list of those costs is included in that. There will be some production costs that will come in after that period of time.

Basically, the $180 billion is designed to include the acquisition of costs that will accrue in the next 6 years for the more permanent basing mode for the MX.

Senator **Denton.** With all due respect, if the window of vulnerability is supposed to occur within the spectrum of that 6-year timeframe, I would hope that we get the production money.

Secretary **Weinberger.** It is not getting the production money, which is there; it is a question of how soon we can get it delivered. That is the reason why we want to deploy the MX as it becomes available in something other than the permanent mode. It is not a matter of not wanting to close the window of vulnerability or not spending enough to do it, or not having enough commitment to do it. It is a matter of the physical fact of when deliveries can be made. That is why we are proposing some of the things that are termed interim solutions or have been given less-flattering terms in the course of the various discussions.

Senator **Denton.** Over the past 15 years or so we have examined a wide variety of basing modes. Air launch or hardened silos have been found less effective than deceptive basing. In my own case, I have not been comfortable with that persuasion, but I had to rely on what I consider to be an authoritative study.

It is remarkable that the administration should brush aside these findings in such a summary fashion, and the mystery to me is on what knowledge was based this new attribution of efficacy of hardening which seems to have been a rather narrowly arrived at finding with which the chairman seems to have considerable reservation.

Secretary **Weinberger**. The hardening, I should emphasize, again, is something that is necessary, we believe, to enable us to deploy immediately the MX in something less than the ultimate best deployment mode.

The multiple-basing system that Senator Exon referred to, and you referred to earlier, is a system that would cost. I think, about $40 billion. It would have deployed 200 MX missiles in 4,600 shelters.

The Soviets now have the capability with their accuracy and weight of their missiles to destroy nearly all 4,600 of those shelters regardless of which ones contain the actual missile.

You would have had a system that is in effect no more survivable than the Minuteman system. It is very difficult to get a survivable ground-based system, but that difficulty, we think, should not drive us to a decision to produce a system that we know is just as vulnerable as what we have now, but costs an enormous sum without accomplishing anything.

We don't think it would add anything to the deterrent quality of our strategic system and we don't think it would add anything to its survivability. We do disagree with some people who favor it, but there is required to be civilian leadership in the Department by the people selected by the President to make the decisions.

It should have been no surprise because, I heard at least six campaign speeches the President made in which he indicated his strong displeasure with the so-called racetrack multiple-protective shelter system. It was a conclusion I had arrived at independently when I looked at the ability of the Soviets to build missiles and the cost of that as compared with our ability to build more shelters.

I just don't see how, under those kinds of considerations, you can think of the MPS as being survivable or as adding anything to our strategic deterrent strength. The President has the same feeling and his is the important decision. The decision that was made was not to turn our whole strategic program upside down, as Senator Exon said a moment ago, but to present to the Congress a very strong strategic program by far the strongest and most extensive, that any the President has presented, with five mutually enforcing parts.

The program includes greatly strengthened ground-based missiles, with provision to deploy them initially in superhard silos and select a far more survivable basing mode, rather than simply building an enormously expensive basing mode that you know is going to be vulnerable.

Senator **Denton**. I will examine the transcript to check again the answer you gave regarding cost, but it seems to me we are in some kind of slippage there. If we need to have in place a system which will fill that gap, it seems to me—I mean the gap exists and I have to believe it does—that we must cost out production money required to do that.

I don't see any logical answer that you are giving me.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We have quite large sums in the $180 billion, Senator—we can get the detail for you in closed session—for the acquisition of the more permanent basing mode for the MX.

Senator DENTON. I will wait for the closed session to hear that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We can furnish it to you directly.

Senator DENTON. You haven't chosen the systems yet, so how can you be costing them out?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have three different options that we are examining, Senator. They are the most promising of the options. They are the continuous airborne patrol: deep underground basing, or basing on the south side of mesas; and the possibility of developing a far more effective ballistic missile defense than we can have now.

If the latter comes out to justify the initial promise, that could be a very useful system. It may be that ultimately we will recommend to you the deployment of the MX in various modes, some or all of these, but there is a provision for a substantial amount—based on rough, preliminary estimates—to acquire one of these new modes that we may recommend to you.

Chairman TOWER. I am sorry, we are going to have to be very strict about the time, because there is a record vote on the floor and the Secretary cannot remain with us much longer.

Let me turn now to Senator Nunn. Our time limitation is 8 minutes.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement before the Foreign Relations Committee 2 days ago, November 3, you stated:

> We did not plan this program so that it will avoid conflict with the now-expired SALT I or the SALT II agreements negotiated by our predecessors. Nevertheless, it is a fact that this program will have no near-term conflicts with either of these documents.
>
> Accordingly, it is consistent with our stated policy that while our SALT review is underway we will take no actions which will undercut existing agreements, so long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

Yesterday, Gen. Bennie Davis, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, testified in open session that the plan to harden Minuteman silos to the pounds per square inch contemplated to accommodate the MX would violate both SALT I and SALT II in terms of the increases in volume in the silo launchers.

Do you agree with General Davis' assessment?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir. I think there is no fundamental inconsistency in my saying no, because we are talking about timeframes when these hardened silos will be built and used.

I think viewing that, that we will be consistent with the policy I stated.

I think primarily we are talking about the difference in time when these hardened silos are built and the duration of the SALT review and our interim policy. I stated there would be no near-term conflict.

Senator NUNN. I don't understand that. Either it would violate it or it would not.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No. Let me try again. There are certain expiration dates in SALT I.

Senator NUNN. It has already expired.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is also the possibility that we might limit the hardening in a way that does not violate the restrictions that were contained in those arguments, even though those are not now enacted treaties.

Senator NUNN. Haven't you been advised by people from the Department of Defense that indeed your hardening of the Minuteman silos would violate SALT I and SALT II?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have been advised that there are ways to do this that would violate it. I have also been advised that we are still looking at what you can do that would stay within the limits. We do not have to decide on this until next year.

Senator NUNN. The SALT I restriction says:

> The parties agree that the term "significant increase" means that an increase will not be greater than 10 or 15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

Are you saying today that you think there are ways you can put the MX in the Minuteman holes without going over 10 percent or 15 percent beyond the volume of those holes today?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have been advised that that can be done with some degradation in hardness.

Senator NUNN. Who advised you of that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Dr. DeLauer's people, who examined it and people who are familiar with the treaty provisions.

As I have said, what we are trying to do is not design a program that violates the treaty but design the kind of program that we think is essential for our strength.

We believe that the program that we are talking about can be carried out within the policy I stated.

Senator NUNN. So you disagree with General Davis?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I disagree with General Davis on a number of counts, including the point he made yesterday that the things we are doing will not help reduce the period of vulnerability. I disagree very strongly with that. I think it is my duty to present to you my disagreement with him. I don't think I would be serving the cause very well if I came up and agreed with everything that one of our military leaders says.

Senator NUNN. I agree with that completely, no doubt about it.

I would like you to submit for the record an explanation of how you are going to get the MX in a Minuteman hole without going above 10 percent or 15 percent of the present volume.

Secretary WEINBERGER. All right, sir.

Senator NUNN. Do you have something in writing on that now?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not with me.

Senator NUNN. I mean in the Department of Defense.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think they have some documents. I don't think it will take long to get it if that is the thrust of your question. I don't have it with me this morning.

[The information follows:]

MX IN MINUTEMAN SILOS

The dimensions of the MX missile were selected, in part, to enable it to fit into the existing Minuteman silos with the greater depth. Thus, we could deploy hundreds of MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos with no modifications for size. In addition, we could increase the hardness of that combination without exceeding the SALT limitations on allowable increases in silo dimensions and volume. But the reality of the situation is that we are no longer actively pursuing such a deployment option, primarily due to congressional direction subsequent to this hearing not to do so.

Senator NUNN. Is it one of those things you thought about before you announced your program, or is it one of those items that you had not looked at?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There was consideration given to it, Senator. You have to bear in mind that SALT I has expired and SALT II was never enacted. As I said in the testimony from which you quoted, we didn't design the program with the idea of staying within those treaties, but we believe the program does not have any near-term conflicts with those agreements.

Senator NUNN. You recognize the volume limitations were put in SALT for our own protection because of the great number of Soviet missiles. Have you thought of the implications of that so far as what the Soviets may do with their missiles?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think it is a question of what they may do. It is a question of what they don't do. They have fractionated——

Senator NUNN. I am talking about the volume limitation. You don't have to convince me that the Soviets have a lot of strategic weaponry. I am talking about volume limitations on silos and missiles, that they violated SALT II.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is no evidence they have. I don't think there would be significant impact on what they have and what they plan if we strengthened and hardened our silos in the way we have recommended.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, on another point, does the Reagan strategic plan bring us back to the 1977 level of MDA?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would have to get some technical data to answer that. I think it greatly strengthens what we have now and improves our deterrent capability.

[Additional information follows:]

I believe your question refers to the military damage expectancy (MDE) measure used by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in their comparative force analyses.

A recent SAC analysis shows that the Reagan program provides a higher level of MDE than the previous program during the critical 1980s. Although neither program achieved the level of MDE that SAC claims existed in 1977 (assuming the attack occurs with U.S. forces at current levels of peacetime alert), the SAC analysis, consistent with all other analyses of strategic capabilities, shows that the Reagan program results in a very significant improvement in strategic force effectiveness in the mid-to-late 1980s compared with today's forces. Historical data can sometimes provide useful insights, but what's really important is where we are today and where we're heading in the future. With the Reagan program, our strategic capabilities will steadily and significantly increase throughout the 1980s.

Senator NUNN. That is military damage assessment?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I understand. What we have to do is to look at what we have now, what the Soviets have, what we need to regain the deterrent strength that we think is essential, and that is what we proposed to you. Regaining some of the things that we could have had if we had done the necessary planning prior to 1977 and acquired things at then-year costs may not be as feasible now or as possible as they were then, given the overall budget situation.

What we propose to you, we believe, gives us sufficient strength when completed to deter attack upon us. That is the important thing.

Senator NUNN. Does the Reagan plan equal the Carter plan in terms of residual weapons?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I have seen some analyses and I think, again, as far as——

Chairman **Tower**. I put that question a little earlier. I have asked for data.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We will furnish the data.

I would like to say at this point that I don't think that this is necessarily a test of whether we are regaining sufficient strength to deter aggression. It is one of the measures that was used in the various SALT discussions. We will certainly furnish the data.

Senator **Nunn**. It is also the test used by those who said we have a window of vulnerability, of which President Reagan was one of the leaders.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We believe we are talking about the quickest and best way to close it. We recognize that until we get the pieces of this very large program in place we cannot feel confidence that we have closed it.

Senator **Nunn**. I look forward to getting your analysis as to how the MX will fit in the Minuteman holes without going over the SALT I limitations.

Secretary **Weinberger**. All right, sir.

Chairman **Tower**. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Thank you very much. I appreciate the courtesy of your hearing.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond

MX BASING ON SMALL SUBMARINES

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Secretary, a finding of a recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is that basing the MX on small submarines could provide us with as capable a system as the one using land basing. Furthermore, the survivability of submarines is high because they are very difficult to detect. A reliable submarine detection system has not been developed as yet and its development is not foreseen. Additionally, submarine endurance is fairly long. It is measured in months.

Mr. Secretary, in view of this OTA study and of the survivability and endurance of submarines, why is it that—

(a) the Administration did not consider this basing mode a viable option and

(b) the Administration has no plans to fund research and development for this form of basing as per your statement before this Committee on October 5, 1981?

Answer. The idea of basing MX on small submarines was carefully and thoroughly evaluated during the period leading up to the Administration's decisions on strategic force modernization. I agree with OTA that such a system is technically feasible; however, various factors lead me to believe that this system is not desirable as a long-term solution to our ICBM survivability problem. Principal among these factors is that such a system offers no apparent advantages over more conventional submarine based missile systems. Deployment of MX on small submarines would transform our strategic forces into a Dyad with a new type of submarine, less capable than TRIDENT, to complement the existing fleet. This action would dilute the flexibility and survivability hedges inherent in a Triad and eliminate the unique capabilities provided by our ICBM force.

The goal of our strategic force modernization program is to enhance the capabilities of each element of the Triad in order to reverse the ominous trends which currently exist in the U.S./USSR strategic imbalance. Continued deployment of TRIDENT submarines and the development of the TRIDENT II missile are viewed as the most cost-effective way of enhancing our sea-based force capabilities. The development of a small submarine to carry the MX missiles does not provide a more cost-effective means of accomplishing this goal. If we sincerely want to provide a reliable, survivable ICBM force, which I strongly believe we should in order to maintain the significant advantages associated with our Triad of strategic forces, we must look elsewhere for a long-term basing mode for MX. The options we are now considering will lead to a solution to our ICBM vulnerability problem while retaining a diverse, flexible Triad of strategic forces, thereby strengthening our deterrent to nuclear war.

CIVIL DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES

Senator **THURMOND.** Mr. Secretary, I have always been interested in civil defense. I was happy to hear you mention civil defense in your statement on October 5 before this committee. Mr Secretary, would you please inform this committee when you expect to have available to you the results of studies that would articulate the viable alternatives in this very vital area?

ANSWER. Shortly after assuming office, this Administration began a rigorous review of existing civil defense programs and policies. Since February, DoD has actively participated in an ongoing series of interdepartmental meetings aimed at acquiring a posture sufficient for our country's needs and at developing options for the President's choice.

The meetings continued over the summer, examining both the current program and possible alternatives from four aspects:

Scale, or the number of survivors they would produce;

Scope, or the extent to which they provided protection for all vital sectors of national society;

Schedule, or the earliest attainable dates at which a viable capability could be achieved, and finally: and

Cost, or the amount of dollar resources required to achieve various levels of capability in terms of scale, scope and schedule.

That review is now in its final stages, and it would be inappropriate to comment in more detail in the absence of a final program and policy decision. The Administration recognizes the significance of civil defense as an element in our strategic posture, and the need for a sound and viable program. We are committed to attaining a balanced, realistic capability that will improve our present posture, and to those initiatives appropriate for acquiring that capability in a cost effective manner.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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